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I. INTRODUCTION
“Eventually, all television will be Internet only.”1 The Internet itself
eventually may be almost “television only.”
Students of the Internet know that the evolution of the Internet is being
driven by the popularity of video entertainment and news. The volume of
such video material being moved over the net already dwarfs email,
document retrieval, and search by several orders of magnitude.2
1. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Uber TV: Internet only TV Stations, 22 UCLA ENT. L. REV. NO.
3 (forthcoming 2016). The Uber TV article concentrates on transformation of the programming
activity, informed by changes in the adjacent activities of content production and distribution.
This Article evaluates the relationship among all three activities and considers the most
appropriate role of law and regulation to ensure that the markets connecting them function
efficiently to deliver technology’s promise.
2. See Tom Butts, What Tom Said: Will Video Eat the Internet?, TV TECHNOLOGY (Feb.
11, 2016), http://www.tvtechnology.com/opinions/0004/will-video-eat-the-internet/277917
(projecting that 4G networks will carry more than 70 percent of all mobile traffic by 2020, and
that global mobile data traffic will reach 30.6 exabytes per month, (up from 3.7 exabytes in 2015),
with video consuming seventy-five percent of that data traffic; identifying WiFi hotspots and
ATSC 3.0 as solutions). The dominance of video entertainment is a relatively new development;
See also Susan B. Crawford, Internet Think, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 467 (2007)
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Accordingly, when thinking about the future of the Internet, it is
appropriate to concentrate on how it will handle video. Designing for
efficient distribution of high-definition video to millions of simultaneous
users may fundamentally alter the Internet’s physical architecture and
make it more difficult to honor the Internet’s founding philosophy.
Efforts by economically powerful television producers, programmers and
distributors to gain a competitive advantage may lead to the Internet
mostly becoming a collection of “walled gardens.”3
The defining feature of the Internet is that it is invisible, creating the
illusion that creators of content and the consumers of that content are
dealing directly with each other, hiding the fact that their exchanges
involve dozens of intermediate computers performing routing,
reformatting, directory, selection, and payment activities. The policy
challenge is how to keep the Internet invisible.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is trying to preserve
the open character of the Internet as it evolves to handle television by
promulgating a net neutrality rule. Advocates of net neutrality tend to
think that it should apply to the entire Internet. That is not really desirable
for the entire Internet, however, especially as the Internet swallows up
other means of distributing information, such as television.
Ten years ago, communications policy involved a war between the
telephone companies and new consumer-electronics and wireless
transmission technologies, with the mostly local cable television industry
and advocates of the relatively new Internet trying to shape the outcome
in their favor. The war now is between Silicon Valley and now-legacy
broadcasters and cable companies.
In more than three dozen law review articles written over the ten-year
period, the author has been active as a student of the evolving technology
policy debate. In 1992, he explained how the Internet would facilitate an
unbundling of hitherto integrated publishing activities, an unbundling
that would disrupt traditional regulatory categories.4 In the mid-1990s he
explored payment systems, format standardization, and methods of

(emphasizing user publishing of material, barely mentioning user consumption of commercially
produced video entertainment).
3. PowerOasis, Inc. v. Wayport, Inc., 2007 WL 1388188, at 2 (D. Mass. May 10, 2007)
(describing walled garden in patent infringement case), vacated, 273 F. App’x. 964 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Neil W. Netanel, Temptations of the Walled Garden: Digital Rights Management and
Mobile Phone Carriers, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 77 (2007) (citing Apple iTunes as
example of walled garden).
4. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Market Structures for Electronic Publishing and Electronic
Contracting, BUILDING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NATIONAL RESEARCH AND EDUCATION NETWORK (1992); See also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort
Liability, the First Amendment, Equal Access, and Commercialization of Electronic Networks, 5
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65 (1992).
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dispute resolution that would facilitate e-commerce.5 He helped lead a
debate in the legal academy over how courts should exercise jurisdiction
over Internet participants.6 He consistently advocated using the Internet
to provide wider public access to government-generated information.7 He
explored the impact of the Internet on concepts of sovereignty and on the
international legal system more generally.8 He considered the tension
between governmental and private management of the Internet.9 He has
5. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Format and Content Standards for the Electronic Exchange
of Legal Information, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 265 (1993); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in
Electronic Network Communities, 38 VILL. L. REV. 349 (1993); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Unbundling
Value in Electronic Information Products: Intellectual Property Protection for Machine Readable
Interfaces, 20 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 415 (1994); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Payment
Infrastructures for Open Systems, 3 DATA LAW REPORT 1 (1995); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Legal and
Technological Infrastructures for Electronic Payment Systems, 22 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J.
1 (1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of
ADR, 15 OH. ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 675 (2000); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Internet Contracts, 1-2 E
DREJTA 101 (2003); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Economic and Other Barriers to Electronic Commerce,
21 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 563 (2000).
6. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: the Role of Intermediaries,
BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE 164 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds. 1997); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Will the JudgmentProof Own Cyberspace?, 32 INT’L L. 1121 (1998); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Introduction, 38 VILL. L.
REV. 319 (1993).
7. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Commercialization of Government Information: Comparisons
between the European Community and the United States, 4 INTERNET RESEARCH 7 (1994); Henry
H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51
(1995); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Sources of Rights to Access Public Information, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
OF RTS. J. 179 (1995); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Should Local Governments Sell Local Spatial
Databases Through State Monopolies?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 449 (1995); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The
Information Highway: On Ramps, Checkpoints, and Tollbooths, 13 GOV’T INFO. Q. 143 (1996);
Perritt, Jr. & Christopher J. Lhulier, Information Access Rights Based on International Human
Rights Law, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 899 (1997); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Freedom of
Information, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 391 (1998); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Zachary Rustad, Freedom of
Information Spreads to Europe, 17 GOV’T INFO. Q. 403 (2000).
8. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 155
(1997); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet’s
Role in Strengthening National and Global Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. 423 (1998);
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997
(1998); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet is Changing the Public International Legal System, 88
KY. L. REV. 885 (2000).
9. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and Innovation in the Global Information
Infrastructure, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261 (1996); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace SelfGovernment: Town-Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413
(1997); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., International Administrative Law for the Internet: Mechanisms of
Accountability, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 871 (1999); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory
Scheme for the Internet, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215 (2001); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet at
20: Evolution of a Constitution for Cyberspace, 20 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1115 (2012);
Perritt, Jr., Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1061 (2000); Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., President Clinton’s National Information Infrastructure Initiative: Community Regained?, 69
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argued against extension of copyright law in a way that frustrates wider
access to music and video entertainment.10 Most recently, he has begun
to explore the technological, economic, and legal issues that arise as
television moves to the Internet.11
The migration of television to the Internet threatens to envelop the
Internet in a web of proprietary technologies, technical barriers to
competition, and complex copyright-licensing restrictions that undermine
the transformative potential of the move. But governmental regulators
must be careful that they not move so aggressively to protect competition
that they end up limiting it. Net neutrality and opening up set-top boxes
are good ideas, but they must be limited to the phenomena where market
forces by themselves will not stamp out monopoly.
This Article begins by sketching a vision of what Internet television
can become. Then it recalls the technologies and politics that shaped the
1996 Telecommunications Act (Act) and identifies the disruptive
developments that require reconceptualizing the Act. It considers eight
specific markets in which the ingredients of television are exchanged,
assessing their structure, considering how new technologies make them
more or less competitive, and identifying the anticompetitive forces that
arise as a result. Having built this foundation, it then evaluates pathways
for regulation, including net neutrality, opening set-top boxes, and the
future of “must-carry” obligations.
II. INTERNET-ONLY TELEVISION: THE VISION
A compelling vision of the future features consumers who have
multiple viewing and input devices, each with wireless access to the
Internet cloud. Through any of them consumers can choose any content
by tapping a key or an icon on a touch screen. As they move around the
house, or leave the living room for the car, an airplane, or a stroll, they
can resume viewing wherever they left off.
Monetization for content producers, programmers, and distributors
begins with access fees for the last wireless or wired mile. Periodic
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991 (1994) (Charles Green Lecture).
10. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Architectures for Music: Law Should Get Out of the Way,
29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 259 (2007); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Flanking the DRM Maginot
Line Against New Music Markets, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L LAW 113 (2007); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Music Markets and Mythologies, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 831 (2010); Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., New Business Models for Music, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 63 (2010); Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Technologies of Storytelling: New Models for Movies, 10 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 106
(2010).
11. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Uber TV: Extending the Internet Revolution (Further) into
Local TV, RTDNA NEWSL. (Jan. 25, 2016); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Uber TV: Internet only TV
stations, 22 UCLA ENT. L. REV. NO. 3 (forthcoming 2016).
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subscription payments or per-session payments12 generate the basic
revenue stream. The distributors, who are in the best position to capture,
because they easily can offer or shut off connectivity, share it with
upstream distributors, programmers and producers.
The basic policy question is whether this vision will materialize on its
own or whether it will be yanked away by economic incentives to create
a more Balkanized experience and to withhold new technologies because
they might disrupt existing business models.
Television viewers should expect to have a television experience like
their ecommerce experiences. Shoppers have access to anyone who wants
to sell goods and services; they're not locked in to Amazon. But no one
expects to get products for free. Various arrangements exist to facilitate
deal-making and revenue collection between the customers at one edge
and sellers at the other edge. In other words, net neutrality has nothing to
do with “free.”
Net neutrality means that customers have to make payment deals only
with the sellers of the end product, and not with every intermediary that
handles the ecommerce traffic. They should be able to roam around the
e-commerce shopping center freely rather than having to pay admission
to a multiplicity of walled gardens.
All the parts in between are invisible—all the deals and negotiations
between content producers and programmers, the specific arrangements
between programmers and distributors, the ways that distributors
exchange packets with the each other to construct multiple pathways, the
ways the packets travel from the backbones to edge connectors and set
top boxes and radio receivers.
As more and more of this takes place in the cloud, it is the Internet
itself that needs to remain invisible. Viewers should still be entitled to the
illusion that they are dealing directly with content producers and not that
they now have to switch constantly from one Internet to another to watch
TV. That would be a step backwards into the world of channel switching.
III. LAW AND MARKETS
Competition law is a protector of market economies. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act codifies the broadest expression of its main principle:
“Every contract . . . in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal.”13
The problem is that all contracts restrain trade. If a piano player agrees
to play for a wedding on a particular Saturday afternoon, the obligations
12. As in the case for Internet access in some hotel rooms.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). The Sherman Act is not the only source of competition law, and
competition law is a central feature of almost all economic regulation whether it is denominated
“antitrust law” or not.
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for both the pianist and the wedding planner restrains trade in the market
buying and selling wedding music. The wedding planner has obligated
herself not to deal with another piano player for the same couple on the
same Saturday afternoon. The pianist has obligated himself not to play
another wedding at the same time. So other pianists have their market
opportunities diminished, and so do wedding planners with respect to
other pianists.
Nevertheless, most contracts, like the wedding music contract, are
legally permissible and the law enforces them. From the beginning,
competition law has straddled the boundary between permissible
restraints on competition, thought to be likely to improve social welfare
and limitations on competition that would diminish social welfare.
Microeconomic analysis of market structures, conditions for competition,
and business practices teaches policymakers what behaviors should be
permissible and which should be prohibited.
In particular, communications law in United States long has been
protective of some anti-competitive arrangements while maintaining
vigilance against others. Most radio frequencies are assigned on an
exclusive basis for a particular geographic area, because if multiple
transmitters operated nearby on the same frequency, their transmissions
would interfere with each other, and reception would be garbled. On the
other hand, the FCC grants licenses on different frequencies for the same
geographic area to ensure that consumers have a choice of more than one
television or radio station.
Moreover, as technology advances, policy as to what level of
competition best serves public welfare changes. For nearly 100 years,
microeconomic theory said that widespread access to telephone
technology was more likely if there was only one telephone company,
because of economies of scale resulting in what economists call “natural
monopoly.” By the 1970s, however, policy began to change. Lower costs
for telephone hardware (consumer premises equipment or CPE) like
telephone sets spawned firms that wanted to sell them to telephone
subscribers as an option to replace the telephone set provided exclusively
by the telephone monopoly. Improvements in microwave radio
technology and switching systems gave rise to enterprises that wanted to
offer competing long-distance telephone service. The eventual result was
the breakup of the telephone monopoly, beginning with the Carterfone
decision in 197614 that forced open the market for consumer premises

14. See N.C. Util. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 552 F.2d 1036, 1042 (4th Cir. 1977) (reviewing
history of AT&T's prohibition of interconnecting other manufacturers’ CPE and of the
Carterphone controversy); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 539 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1976)
(allowing antitrust action against Bell System for its refusal to allow interconnection of private
branch exchange equipment).
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equipment, and the MCI antitrust decision15 that forced open the market
for long-distance telephone service. In each case, the government forced
private enterprise to open up specific markets to competition. It
prohibited the telephone monopoly from tying basic access to the
telephone infrastructure—getting a dial tone—to the purchase of other
products or services, such as long-distance service and telephone
hardware.
Various kinds of tying arrangements proliferate throughout the
economy. If one buys a Tesla automobile, Tesla does not offer traction
motors from different manufacturers as an option; the car comes with
Tesla’s traction motors. Take it or leave it as a package, even though a
particular purchaser might believe that traction motors from General
Electric have superior performance or better prices.
Tying arrangements like this can be explicitly contractual, as when a
seller says, “My performance under this contract is conditioned on your
buying your automobile maintenance from me rather than from the
garage down the street,” or it can be the natural result of integration, a
form of business organization in which one firm produces multiple
products or services that it offers as a package. Integration can be
horizontal: McDonald's sells both breakfast and lunch; Disney sells
television programming, theme park experiences, and Mickey Mouse
dolls. Or, it can be vertical, when one firm produces closely related
complementary products or services and sells them together. A pizzeria
purchases the dough, the cheese, the tomato sauce, and the pepperoni,
combines them, and sells the entire pizza.
Some tying arrangements are so likely to enhance social welfare that
their legitimacy is taken for granted: Tesla’s selling the batteries, body,
seats, and traction motors as an automobile; the pizzeria’s selling the
entire pizza. In all of those instances, the ingredients are complementary,
and tying them together reduces the transaction costs of consumers
having to search for them separately and to assemble them after purchase.
Complementarity is particularly common when the potentially
separate ingredients or service component represent a necessary sequence
of activities: buying the dough, cheese, meat, and tomato sauce, mixing
them together in the right proportions, cooking them together; and
delivering the pizza to the consumer. When complementarity is
sequential16 like this, the markets for the individual ingredients are said
to have a vertical relationship with each other. When products compete
with each other they are said to have a horizontal relationship with each
15. See MCI Commc’n Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983)
(reviewing judgment on jury award of $1.8 billion damages against AT&T; affirming antitrust
liability but remanding for new trial on damages).
16. The dough and the pizza have a sequential relationship: first comes the dough, then the
pizza.
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other. The market in which Dominos competes with Pizza Hut is
horizontal.
Most markets have both a horizontal and vertical dimension.
Domino’s can buy its mozzarella cheese from Leprino Foods or someone
else. That is the horizontal market. Domino’s could decide to integrate its
operations; it could buy cows and dairy farms and make its own cheese.
That would implicate the vertical market.
Tying arrangements can exist in either vertical or horizontal markets.
Disney can condition access to ABC television programs on purchase of
a season pass to Disney World. McDonald’s can condition sales of Big
Macs at lunch on a customer also coming to McDonald’s for breakfast
pancakes and sausage.
In each of the examples given in this section, chosen to be simple and
pure, there is still room for argument about classification of market
features. Are breakfast and lunch competitors? They are in the sense that
one can have a big breakfast and skip lunch or vice a versa with no ill
effect. But they also are sequential and complementary. The tradition is
to have breakfast first, and then to eat lunch later. Breakfast and lunch
complement each other because both are part of a balanced diet. As
component parts of one's activities in a 24-hour period, people refer to
them as a package: a “day.”
Vertical arrangements are more likely to enhance social welfare than
horizontal arrangement. The law looks more kindly on Walt Disney
Company’s providing only one means of transportation inside its theme
parks than it would on Disney’s conditioning access to Disney World to
those with television sets that receive only ABC television programs.
Competition law has always struggled with this kind of classification; if
one classifies a market restraint is vertical, it is more likely to be
permissible. If one classifies it as horizontal it is more like it to be
prohibited.
If one classifies the relationship of two products as complementary,
tying is more likely to enhance social welfare; if the relationship is
competitive, tying them together is likely to diminish social welfare.
So it is with communications regulation. Does tying multiple streams
of programming together in a cable television package enhance social
welfare or does it diminish it because it restricts subscriber freedom to
buy different kinds of programming from different sources? Would it be
better for the economy if AT&T refused to sell DSL Internet access to
anyone who is not a voice telephone customer?
In the vast majority of cases, self-interested supply and demand
behavior eliminates the harmful arrangements, and causes the beneficial
arrangements to rise to the top. AT&T and Verizon are happy to sell DSL
Internet access to anyone within the reach of their wires and optical
fibers; if either ties Internet access to conventional analog voice telephone
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service, it loses customers and revenue. If Disney refuses access to
Disney World to people who watch NBC or CBS, it loses theme park
revenue.
Each of the markets for separate components of Internet television
offers the same choices of classification and welfare conclusions. The
subsequent sections in this article explore pro-competition forces and
anti-competitive temptations in order to build a foundation for sensible
policy choices about the relationship between the Internet and the
government. At each level an enormous range of technical alternatives
exist for tying complementary communication and information
processing activities together. Some are obviously beneficial; others are
obviously harmful; the effect of many is debatable.
IV. THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
Regulation of Internet television proceeds from several provisions of
the Act.17 It, however, became law in a very different technological and
political context than exists ten years later.
A. Genesis of the 1996 Act
In the mid-1990s, pressure was growing for the Congress to codify
and extend a patchwork of regulatory initiatives that subjected cable
systems mainly to local regulation, imposed distinct federal licensing
requirements on radio and television broadcasters, and was forcing
telephone monopolies to open their infrastructures to connections by
competitors. A consent decree had required the fragmentation of the
nationwide AT&T telephone monopoly, and the FCC had issued orders
imposing open network architecture requirements on the successors to
AT&T—the “Baby Bells”—under which they had to provide comparably
efficient interconnections to new entrants to the telephony industry. As
the Act was beginning to crystallize, this author, in the first edition of his
book, LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY, said:
Telecommunications reform legislation almost certainly will relax
restrictions on the creation of the telephone market by cable
operators and entry into the cable market by telephone operators.
It also may extend universal service obligations and certain
common carriage obligations beyond “plain old telephone service”
(POTS) into certain basic aspects of digital non-voice
communication and information services, possibly under the open
platform proposal initially submitted by Mitchell Kapor, the
17. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
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developer of Lotus 1-2-3 and the founder of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation.18
In 1985 the dominant players were the broadcasters, Hollywood, and
telephone monopoly. The Internet was developing in universities and
defense labs but was not yet part of the public consciousness. Cable
access to television was growing, but the supplier market was highly
fragmented, with one or a few cable distributors in each metropolitan
area, reflecting their roots as community access television (CATV)
providers. Ten years earlier a few aggressive startups like MCI and Sprint
had successfully nibble at the edges of the long-distance telephone
market, demanding that AT&T open up access to its last-mile links to
telephone subscribers. Some equipment manufacturers had persuaded the
FCC to force open the telephone equipment market. Technological
advances in wireless communication were inducing the telephone
companies to consider new architectures for mobile telephone service,
and consumer electronics firms like RadioShack were eager to supply the
equipment of what was becoming the cellular telephone system.
By 1990, a few visionaries, entrepreneurs and academics, were
predicting that, in 20 or 25 years, point-to-point communication would
mostly be wireless instead of wired, and entertainment would mostly be
wired instead of wireless.19
Regulation of competition in the telephone industry under the AT&T
antitrust consent decree20 was wearing thin and a shifting configuration
of interest groups preferred a regulatory regime that the reflected political
input, in other words, fundamental statutory reform of the 1936
Communications Act and the much more recent Cable Act. The incoming
Clinton Administration had to select among a variety of philosophies for
the recent privatization of the Internet. Advances in personal computer
technology were persuading early adopters that small computers were
engines of productivity, especially if they could be interconnected easily.
A few visionaries predicted that a ubiquitous Internet with PCs at the
edges would come to represent the dominant infrastructure for commerce,
18. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 335 (1996)
[hereinafter PERRITT, LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY].
19. November, 1990 conversation at Harvard Kennedy School with John T. Dunlop and
other economists.
20. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), amended sub nom. United States v. W. Elec.
Co., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. United States v. W.
Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and modified sub nom. United States v. W. Elec. Co.,
Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1 (DDC 1995), vacated, 84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (interpreting consent
decree and applying it to information services; holding that bottlenecks gave local telephone
companies market power over information services markets; terminating consent decree because
of enactment of Telecommunications Act of 1996).
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communications, and entertainment. They recognized that the philosophy
and technological architecture embedded in the Internet was
fundamentally different from the concentrated, centralized philosophy
represented by the telephone companies and the broadcast industry.
Broadcasters and the telephone companies controlled their own
infrastructure; the Internet was intended to permit a democratized,
competitive infrastructure in which thousands or millions of individuals
and businesses could seamlessly integrate their offerings to provide
delivery of content without caring about it its nature; any vendor with a
new idea could hook up at the edge. Any consumer interested in new
offerings could hook up at the edge halfway around the world and the two
could exchange information without caring how it got from one side of
the Internet to the other. People were beginning to talk about electronic
commerce conducted through the Internet.
B. The Markets
In 1996 public policy focused on three markets: the market for
interconnecting long-distance service with local service; the market for
interfacing CPE with local service; and the market for consumer access
to local service.
The telephone market was a monopoly and completely integrated
vertically. The policy goal was to craft a way of overcoming legal and
economic barriers to entry by new providers of long distance service,
local service, and CPE.
Cable television was an essentially local phenomenon. The cable
provider put an over the air TV antenna on a hill or, sometimes, made
arrangements directly with the television station to get a wired stream,
and distributed the signals to its customers through a plant covering a
limited geographic area. This was completely consistent with the
regulatory regime that emphasized local control and local franchises. But
Ted Turner understood the potential of tying local cable networks
together so that each of them could carry programming from out of the
area. Collectively, they would become a strong competitor to national
television networks, delivering national news and entertainment
programming. The result, which was already beginning to take shape in
1996, transformed cable television into an economic activity that was
largely indistinguishable from broadcast television, although its
regulatory structure still reflected dramatically different assumptions.
C. The Philosophy of the Act
Putting together the Act was a process that took three years of
intensive lobbying and legislative drafting. One virtual war, one
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philosophy, and one and a half visions were dominant. The war was
between the legacy telephone companies recently split apart from the
AT&T monopoly and a variety of new entrants who were pressing for
access to the existing infrastructure so they could enter the market Their
ranks comprised not only the wannabe long-distance carriers like MCI
and Sprint, but a variety of CLECs who wanted to offer local telephone
service. The economic debate in this context was over how much of a free
ride the new entrants should get on investments made over decades by
the telephone companies, recognizing that too much of a free ride would
reduce incentives to innovate, both by the ILECs and the CLECs.
The philosophy favored deregulation, a shift away from command and
control and government prescription of engineering standards and prices
toward a regulatory regime aimed mainly at promoting competition rather
than assuring that public utilities “served the public,” in exchange for
access to the market. The philosophy was animated not only by
intellectual capital developed in universities, particularly by the
economics faculties, but also by certain new technological realities. The
rationale for detailed public service mandates on the broadcast industry
based on government grant access to “scarce spectrum” did not make any
sense when the same content was carried by wire instead of by
electromagnetic signals traveling through space.
The major vision was a market in which cable companies and
telephone companies would trespass on each other’s turf: telephone
companies would distribute entertainment comment content, mainly
television programming, and cable companies would offer telephone
service. The half vision, so dubbed because it had not yet crystallized
very well, and there was almost no proof in the market of its feasibility,
was that the Internet would somehow play a role in all of the change.
The center of gravity of the Act was restructuring of the telephone
industry. Twenty sections contain requirements for telephone companies
to open up their infrastructure to competitors at multiple levels, ranging
from consumer premises equipment to access to their backbone switching
equipment. Seven sections involve direct satellite broadcast, and eight
involve cable TV, mostly adjusting federal-state relationships regulating
pricing and other franchise terms. Eleven other sections of the act focus
on video programming, and half of those relate to allowing telephone
companies to offer video programming.
The word “Internet” appears only eleven times in the statute, twice in
the House report, once in the Senate report, and nine times in the
Conference report’s discussion of the statutory text.
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V. TECHNOLOGIES OF DISRUPTION
Seven disruptive technologies transformed telecommunication and
electronic entertainment industry after the 1996 statute was enacted. Two
of them, the Internet and widespread deployment of cellular telephone
systems, were visible when the act was being put together, but how they
would crystallize in the marketplace was no more than guesswork. Three
others, spectrum reallocation, ATSC 3.0, deployment of Internet
multicasting protocols, and targeted advertising developed much more
recently.
A. The Internet
As this author said in 1996, describing the Internet to lawyers who
were then only dimly aware of it:
The Internet is an open architecture; indeed, that is all it is. Many
people are surprised to find out that the Internet is not an entity.
There is no chief executive officer of the Internet, nor any board
of directors, nor any central network administrative apparatus. The
Internet is defined as a collection of several million computer
networks connected to each other through routers that use the
TCP/IP protocol suite and share a common name and address
space.21
The Internet is not a defined physical network; it is a philosophy and
a family of technical standards that can be implemented on any kind of
physical network—systems of routers wired together with coaxial cables
and optical fibers; user computers and servers wired together with
ethernet cables or linked via Wi-Fi connections; or routers and user
computers linked by long-distance radio signals. As long as the
computers and the switches that connect them to the links adhere to the
relevant protocols, they can exchange traffic with each other.22
Common usage refers to the Internet as the “cloud”23 and its hundreds
of millions of connections with individual users or autonomous networks

21. PERRITT, LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY, supra note 18, at 13.
22. See Susan P. Crawford, Internet Think, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 467 (2007)
[hereinafter Crawford Think] (explaining the three different perspectives on what constitutes the
Internet).
23. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 694 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d on other
grounds, sub nom Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (using the term
“cloud”).
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as its “edge,”24 or the “last mile.”25 Colloquially, the links between
routers, and sometimes the links with their associated routers at each end,
are referred to as “pipes.”26
The Internet’s philosophy is expressed by the open systems
interconnection (OSI) stack.27 The OSI stack identifies six layers:
physical, datalink, network, session, presentation, and application.28 The
specific technology used in any one layer is indifferent to the technology
used in the layers above it and below it in the stack. Similarly, the Internet
is indifferent to the means used at the physical layer, which may be wires
or radio waves; it is indifferent to the kind of content that passes through
it; it does not care about the hardware and software that operates beyond
its edges; and it has no central traffic director. Instead, information moves
through it from origin to destination in packets defined according to the
Internet Protocol (IP). Specialized computers called routers direct
packets to other routers according to routing tables maintained by the
routers themselves. Multiple “hops” from one router to another determine
the overall path from original to destination, which can change from
packet to packet depending on link state. Each router is a specialized,
high performance, but relatively stupid computer. Its job is simple: to
receive packets in the order they are presented on one or more input ports,
read the destination contained in the IP packet header, look it up in its
routing table, and direct the packet to one of its output ports. All routers
have two or more output ports.
Routing tables on each router periodically update themselves
according to specialized messages exchanged among the routers.29 The
24. See Verizon v. F.C.C., 740 F.3d 623, 628-629 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (using the term "edge,"
and invalidating FCC's net neutrality order).
25. Id. at 631 (using the term “last mile”).
26. See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, Virginia, 257 F.3d 356, 359 (4th Cir.
2001) (referring to Internet conduits as “pipelines”); Susan Crawford, Internet Think, 5 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 467, 467 (2007) (referring to Internet connections as “pipes”).
27. Uyless D. Black, OSI: A MODEL FOR COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS 8-10
(1990) (providing overview of OSI layers).
28. Phil Zito, What is the OSI Model, BUILDING AUTOMATION MONTHLY (May 3, 2013),
http://buildingautomationmonthly.com/what-is-the-osi-model/ (table illustration the OSI stack
and the protocols associated with each layer).
29. RFC, Internet Control Message Protocol, at RFC 792, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc792
[hereinafter RFC] (“ICMP messages are sent in several situations: for example, when a datagram
cannot reach its destination, when the gateway does not have the buffering capacity to forward a
datagram, and when the gateway can direct the host to send traffic on a shorter route.” RFC 792.
For example, a gateway router may send an ICMP that says, “don’t send packets addressed to
XXX to me; send them instead to YYY.” RFC 791 at 13. The border gateway protocol, defined
in RFC 4271, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4271 (2006), exchange routing information between
neighbor routers; collectively the information exchanged between neighbors permit them to
construct a path from anywhere to anywhere on the Internet. “The primary function of a BGP
speaking system is to exchange network reachability information with other BGP systems. This
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combination of routing tables and routing messages maintain a current
awareness of all other routers connected anywhere in the net and calculate
the most efficient path from any router to any other.
The routing system is anchored in a defined address space, in which
each computer (including routers) connected to the Internet has a unique
IP address. Expansion of the address space occurs because routers at the
edge, called gateway routers can make up their own addresses for
computers connected to them but not visible to the Internet at large. These
are called, “autonomous networks.”30 Traffic coming from the cloud to a
computer beyond the edge on an autonomous network simply is
addressed to the gateway router, and the gateway reroutes it to the
appropriate computer on the net so that it connects to the cloud.
IP packets comprise a string of digital bits enclosed in a package, each
of which has a header with the IP addresses for the origin and destination
of that particular packet. The routers do not care what is inside the IP
packets, and neither do the links connected to them. The routers faithfully
process the packets, understanding the headers, but merely passing along
the digital bits inside them (the “payload”), and the links transmit the
stream of digital bits, not caring what is in the header or the payload.
Each router examines the destination address of each packet, and
looks it up in its routing table. First, it determines if the entire address is
on the local network which the router serves as a gateway.31 If it is, the
router lets it remain on the internal network to be selected by the network
interface card on the appropriate node. If it is not, it looks up the network
address in its routing table.32 The network address is the first twenty-four
bits of the IP address, omitting the host part of the address (the last eight
bits of an IP address).33 For an address not on the local network, the
routing table specifies the next-hop router.34 Most routing tables also
contain a default entry, which specifies where a packet should be sent if
a network address cannot be found for it.35 If no route can be found, the
router sends a “network unreachable” message back to the originating
host.36
When a router boots up, it may activate a static routing table or it may
send an advertisement to neighboring routers, soliciting their routing
network reachability information includes information on the list of Autonomous Systems (ASes)
that reachability information traverses. This information is sufficient for constructing a graph of
AS connectivity for this reachability” RFC 4271 at 1.).
30. LANs within a single enterprise are examples of autonomous networks.
31. 1 W. RICHARD STEVENS, TCP/IP ILLUSTRATED 112 (1994) (describing sequence of
routing logic).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 7-8, 42 (describing IP address and subnetting).
34. STEVENS, supra note 31, at 113.
35. Id. at 114 (describing default entries).
36. Id. at 117.
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tables.37 Advertisements list the routes reachable by that router.38 As
routes change, and as new routers become active or drop off, adjacent
routers update their routing tables according to the advertisements, and
the changes propagate through the Internet. The basic approach means
that each router’s routing table need only contain the addresses of the next
hop routers and not the addresses of every one of the millions of routers
on the Internet.
Higher level protocols at the transport layer of the OSI stack run on
origin and destination computers beyond the edge of the Internet. They
define the information contained in the package. For example, the
transport control protocol (TCP),39 maintains the illusion of a persistent
connection that lasts as long as any particular communication session.
TCP is implemented by computers beyond the edge of the Internet,
typically the computer that originates the information and the one that
displays it to a user or processes its content. TCP processes segments
encapsulated in IP packets. TCP, and not IP, organizes packets in the
sequence in which they were sent, and associates a sequence of segments
with a communication session. TCP also determines whether any
segments are missing or corrupted. When a segment is missing or
corrupted the destination TCP asks the originating TCP to resend it.
The routers are ignorant about the correct sequence of packets or
whether one has been omitted from a stream; their job is merely to receive
packets on their input ports, and determine what output port they should
be sent to in order to get them closer to their destination. They are
specialized “best efforts” devices and let the next layer in the OSI stack,
such as TCP, worry about maintaining the integrity of a communication
stream.
TCP is not a very good protocol for audio and video streams, because
it periodically interrupts the flow of the stream to ask for missing
segments. Alternative transport layer protocols, the most basic of which
is UDP, avoid this limitation by ignoring missing segments so that the
stream flow is uninterrupted.40
37. Id. at 123.
38. Id. at 123-24.
39. TCP, along with IP, are the core Internet protocols. See Info. Scis. Inst., Univ. of S.
Cal., Transmission Control Protocol DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specification, RFC: 793
(Jon Postel ed. 1981) (defining TCP), available at https://tools. ietf.org/html/rfc793.
40. See User Datagram Protocol, RFC: 768 (Jon Poste ed. 1980)(defining the User
Datagram Protocol), available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc768. Real time audio and video
information is carried by Real-Time Transport Protocol ("RTP") in conjunction with UDP. See
H. Schulzrinne et al., RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications, RFC: 3550 (2003)
(defining RTP: “Applications typically run RTP on top of UDP to make use of its multiplexing
and checksum services; both protocols contribute parts of the transport protocol functionality.
However, RTP may be used with other suitable underlying network or transport protocols (see
Section 11). RTP suppports data transfer to multiple destinations using multicast distribution if
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Above TCP and its alternatives in the OSI stack are presentation
protocols such as ASCII, JPEG, MPEG, and GIF. Textual information
usually is encoded according to the ASCII standard, still images as jpeg
or gif, audio information according to mp3, and video information as
mp4, mp3, subsets of MPEG.41
At the application layer, hypertext transfer protocol (http) defines the
World Wide Web.42 Http messages encapsulated in TCP frames are
responsible for requesting discrete pages from servers determined by
their Internet addresses, translated into universal resource locators
(URLs). Http is stateless, meaning that all a server running http does is
receive http messages, one at a time, find the page desired, and send the
page, formatted in the html protocol to the requester. It has short-term
amnesia: it responds to a request for a page and then forgets about it and
waits for another request, which may be from the same user or a
completely different one desiring a completely different and unrelated
page. Http leaves it to other procedures at the application layer to create
the illusion of a continuing information exchange between a server and a
particular user client. Cookies are the dominant way of doing this. When
an http server responds to a user request, it sends, not only the html page
requested, but along with it a short message identifying the user and
providing other information about the information exchange session.
When the user requests another page from the same server, the user’s
client computer sends the cookie back along with the new http request. In
their simplest realization, cookies avoid a user having to log in again each
time he requests another page from the same website.
At the application lawyer, competing browsers such as Google
Chrome, Microsoft Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Apple Safari manage
the client side of the http sessions and render html pages on that user’s
display device, including video. They communicate via an exchange of
http messages with operating systems on the server-side, such as Apache
and Microsoft's Internet Information Services.
Http messages are expressed in presentation layer protocols such as
ASCII, encapsulated in TCP or UDP segments, which are encapsulated
in IP packets, which in turn are encapsulated into datalink frames defined
by Ethernet, for example, and then translated into electrical impulses to
provided by the underlying network.”), available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3550 (2003).
41. The application, presentation, and session layers are more tightly integrated than the
lower layers. Sometimes a function is performed in one of the layers and sometimes in another.
Sometimes the presentation layer is merely a pass-through for information encoded in a higher
layer. See Black, supra note 27, at 362 (describing the relationships between the application,
presentation, and session layers).
42. The original version of http is defined by R. Fielding et al., Hypertext Transfer Protocol
– HTTP/1.1, RFC: 2616 (1999) available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616. It was superseded
by M. Belshe et al., Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2), RFC: 7540 (2015),
available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540.
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be transferred by wire or electromagnetic radiation by devices at the
physical layer. At the receiving end, hardware demodulates the signal into
connection layer frames, and software progressively unwraps each layer
to reveal the layer above it. Metaphorically, it is like a message
(application layer) enclosed in one envelope, which is enclosed in another
envelope, and so on. The programs running at each layer open only one
envelope.
The capacity of the Internet is determined by a combination of router
processing speed, link bandwidth, and the number of alternative
pathways from each origin to each destination. If there are six pathways
from one server to one client, each router need have only 1/6 of the
processing power as it would need if there were only one path. Likewise
for link bandwidth. Router processing power must be matched to link
bandwidth. A very fast router can function no faster than the capacity of
the links connecting it. A slow router cannot fill the bandwidth of a high
capacity link.
The Internet has a physical reality, of course. The electrons and
photons that carry the signals representing digital bits move over optical
fibers; coaxial cables; and radio, in the form of microwave transmissions,
UHF cellphone transmissions, and satellite transmissions.43 Typically,
Internet service providers lease optical fiber or radio capacity from
entities that specialize in providing such connectivity, but some entities,
like cable MVPDs and the telephone companies, provide their own
physical connectivity. They often have physically buried their own cable
or established their own transmitters. Multiple types of Internet service
providers use this physical capacity. Tier 1 providers handle the largest
volumes of Internet traffic,44 and peer with each other.45 Tier 3 provides
last-mile connectivity to users. Tier 2 providers are intermediate in size.
Some enterprises participate in all three tiers.
Since the turn of the 21st-century, content delivery networks (CDNs)
have arisen.46 CDNs which combine load sharing, caching, and network
43. Physical Layer—OSI Model, http://www.studytonight.com/ computer-networks/osimodel-physical-layer (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
44. In 2013, the top Tier 1 backbone providers were Level 3, NTT, Telia Sonera, GTT,
Cogent, Taga, Spring, Verizon, Tel. Italia Sparkle, TCCW, China Telecom, XO, and Hurricane
Electric. See Earl Zmijewski, DYN RESEARCH, A Baker’s Dozen (2013), available at
http://research.dyn.com/2014/01/bakers-dozen-2013-edition/.
45. Peering, in contrast to transit, involves exchanging traffic without paying each other.
Transit connections provide access to any place on the Internet for a fee. Networks with roughly
equivalent traffic levels usually peer; networks with disparate levels of traffic usually enter into
transit arrangements.
46. George Pallis & Athena Vakali, Insight and Perspectives for Content Delivery
Networks, 49 COMM. OF THE ACM 101, 101 (2006); Gilbert Held, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
CONTENT DELIVERY NETWORKS xiii (2d ed. 2011) (referring to “hidden network within the
Internet”); Mukaddim Pathan, Cloud-Based Content Delivery and Streaming, in ADVANCED
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connectivity.47 They store content on a multiplicity of large servers
placed geographically near the edge to serve expected demand. The
multiple servers provide greater reliability through redundancy and
greater efficiency by offloading repeated requests for the same content
from one central server.48
The physical architecture is simple. A connection, say an optical fiber,
connects to routers at each end. Peering and transit sites, called Internet
Exchange Points,49 are simply large routers. The mesh has considerable
flexibility. A content producer or programmer may want to carry its
traffic closer to where its viewers are.50
It can arrange to lease its own optical fiber, buy its own large-scale
routers, and make peering or transit arrangement with other backbone
providers closer to where the largest groups of viewers are.51 Or, if it does
not want to be in the physical networking business, it can hand off its
traffic further upstream to a third-party backbone provider or to a CDN
which will hand it off to backbones at multiple points further
downstream.52

CONTENT DELIVERY, STREAMING, AND CLOUD SERVICES 1 (Mukaddim Pathan et al. eds., 2014)
(explaining growing popularity of CDNs).
47. See In the Matter of Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601,
5688 (2015) (noting that CDNs enter into both transit and peering arrangements with backbone
providers).
48.
ISPs regularly cache popular content—anything from simple text to streaming
video—so that when a subscriber requests such content it can be retrieved more
quickly (and with less load on the network) than would occur if the request were
sent to its specified destination. And it’s not just an ISP’s own servers that cache
content; an entire industry of content delivery networks have sprung up to move
content closer to Internet users to improve performance.
Id. at 5956 (Pai, dissenting).
49. An Internet exchange point typically is configured as ethernet ring in a single facility
to which each participating carrier attaches a gateway router. See Equinix Internet Exchange,
http://www.equinix.com/services/interconnection-connectivity/internet-exchange/ (last visited
Feb. 19, 2017) (offering peering at 19 Internet Exchange Point locations, worldwide).
50. Building a pipe that terminates close to be edge reduces the number of hops packets
must take from their origin to their destination. Reducing the number of hops minimizes delays
and increases effective bandwidth.
51. See 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5688 (noting that AT&T, Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and
Verizon have built or purchased their own backbones).
52. Id. at 5689.
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The chart compares the Internet architecture of the 1990s to that of now,
emphasizing the role of CDNs.
The Internet protocols are becoming the norm for video distribution.
Television programmers are harmonizing their internal exchanges on IP.
Eighty percent of telephone MVPD providers use IPTV.53 Cable Internet
access providers are embracing a decentralized infrastructure that looks
like the Internet’s multicasting.
The Internet’s core virtue is that it is invisible. Producers and
consumers of information have the illusion of dealing directly with each
other. Each has a broad choice. Any consumer can deal with any
producer, and all producers have access to all consumers
The dominant policy goal is to keep the Internet invisible, in this
sense.
B. Multicasting
When television moves through the Internet, multicasting is a better
way to stream it than the one-to-one package exchange that typifies
symmetrical Internet exchanges. Multicasting has been an Internet
protocol since 1995. It eliminates some of the inefficiencies of processing
viewer requests, packet-by-packet. When many viewers request the same
content, multicasting content servers to send one stream of packets from
the origin to a small number of intermediate routers which distribute it to
the edge of the Internet where radio transmitters or cable head ends break
it up into streams for each user. Although it is interactive, it is a one-toa-great-many protocol rather than the one-to-one protocol represented by
simple IP and TCP. Internet vendors like the telephone companies who
53. In the Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the
Delivery of Video Programming, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 3253, 3264 (2015); FCC, 2015 Video
Competition Report, ¶ 27, at 11.
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see their future in wireless are working hard to extend the original
multicast protocols into what is colloquially called IPTV,54 even as the
television industry rushes to get ATSC 3.055 in place.
C. Cellular Telephony
The cellular telephone system is a mesh of interconnected relatively
low power radio transmitters and receivers, almost always combined into
transceivers. The transceivers and their antennas are grouped and placed
on cell towers, with their power and propagation characteristics assigned
to cover a limited amount of territory, rarely more than 10 ten square
miles.
The cellphone system shares frequencies by dividing its coverage area
into multiple cells.56 Each cell has a cluster of VHF or UHF frequencies
for communication and a control channel. Adjacent cells use different
frequencies to prevent interference.57 Cell towers contain multiple
antennas and radiate relatively low power signals from a multiplicity of
transmitters, one for each frequency, and receive transmissions from the
individual cell phones. When the signal from a cell phone becomes
stronger in an adjacent cell than in the cell to which a cellphone is
connected, the Mobile Telephone Switching Office (MTSO) hands off
the customer to an adjacent cell.58
The Base Station Controller (BSC)59 and Radio Network Controller
(RNC),60 subsystems within the MTSO are responsible for detecting
when a customer wants to make a call by sending an attached message on
a cell’s control channel and the call to an available frequency within the
cell.61 The same subsystems keep track of all cellphones within the range
54. Internet Protocol Television. See Tom Nolle, Defining IPTV to Clarify Your Video
Planning, http://searchtelecom.techtarget.com/tip/Defining-IPTV-to-clarify-your-video-planning
(last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
55. See Rich Chernock, ATSC 3.0: Where We Stand, http://atsc.org/ newsletter/atsc-3-0where-we-stand/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) (describing how hard the television companies are
working to finish ATSC 3.0).
56. See Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, Eng’g Handbook, 594-95 (Edmund A. Williams et al.
eds., 10th ed. 2007) (explaining architecture of cell networks) [hereinafter NAB Engineering
Handbook].
57. See Criterion Cellular.com, Cellular Frequencies and Bands in use Today,
http://www.criterioncellular.com/tutorials/ bandsandfrequencies.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2017)
(explaining that different cell sites of each carrier use different frequencies).
58. Cory Janssen, Handoff, TECHOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/
16851/handoff (last visited Feb 19, 2017).
59. GSM—The
Base
Station
Subsystem,
http://www.tutorialspoint.com/
gsm/gsm_base_station_subsystem.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
60. UMTS—A New Network, http://www.tutorialspoint.com/umts/umts_a_new_
network.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
61. See Mobile Telephone Switching Office, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_
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of a cell and signal them when they receive calls.62 4G and LTE systems,
representing more advanced technology with higher data rates and greater
capacity, have somewhat different architectures,63 but the principles for
beginning and terminating call, for handoffs, and for accounting are the
same.
The MTSO connects mobile calls to the public switched telephone
system (PSTN). Data exchanges, as contrasted with voice conversations,
are routed by the MTSO to the Internet cloud, rather than to the PSTN.
The MTSO also is responsible for accounting for call minutes or data
used and for roaming—handing off a customer to another provider when
the customer is outside the coverage area of the provider to which she is
subscribed.64
D. Micro and Pico Cells
Wireless providers increase the capacity of their networks through a
variety of techniques. First, they decrease the height of cell towers,
thereby reducing the range of each, resulting in smaller cells and
increased frequency reuse. Eventually, however, demands on the capacity
results in congestion and deteriorating performance. The answer is to
subdivide each of these macrocells into smaller sub-cells, known as small
cells, comprising micro- and picocells.65 Small cells use the same
frequencies as their macrocell parents, but provide higher received power
to user devices than the macrocells, causing the user devices to select
them. “Backhaul”—the signals and messages tying all the sites together
is provided ideally by optical fiber links, but, when necessary, the system
uses wireless links implemented on higher frequencies, in the 18 and 23
GHz bands and even millimeter wave in the 60 and 80 GHz bands,
affording greater available bandwidth through larger slices of spectrum,
at the expense of greater atmospheric attenuation, which does not matter
as much given their smaller size.
Small cell sites achieve greater density than macrocells by closer
spacing, possible because of lower output power and lower height.
Typically, 14 small cell sites serve each macrocell. Small cell transmitters
provide stronger signals to user devices close to a small cell than their
Telephone_Switching_Office (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) (explaining attachment and handoff
procedure).
62. Id.
63. See Robert Triggs, 4G vs LTE—What is the Difference?, ANDRIOD AUTHORITY,
http://www.androidauthority.com/4g-vs-lte-274882/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) (explaining 4G
and LTE).
64. Robert Keith, How Cell Phones Work, http://iml.jou.ufl.edu/projects/fall04/keith/
Works.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) (explaining roaming and accounting functions of MTSO).
65. Michael Alfaker, An Efficient Approach to Small Cell Design, AGL Small Cell
Magazine, Dec. 2015 [hereinafter Small Cell Design].
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associated macrocells, causing the user devices to connect to the small
cells instead of increasing the load on the macrocells.
Finding locations for small cells is a constraint. Providers must make
use of light poles, utility poles, billboards, and building façades, and
eventually they run out of space.
Eventually, cells using licensed spectrum to define the physical layer
at the edge of the Internet, blend with user provided Wi-Fi points of
presence using unlicensed spectrum beyond the edge of the Internet.
Capacity requirements can be increased further by deploying the cell
infrastructure’s equivalent of multicasting—a technique known as
Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Services (MBMS). Ultimately, the
strategy of increasing capacity by reducing transmitter power, can be
reversed by shifting more of the traffic to boomers, which have very large
coverage areas and which use the ultimate in multicasting—sending one
signal to an infinite number of viewers.
E. Frequency Sharing
When the basic regulatory regime for broadcast was erected, radio
technology meant that frequency sharing would produce chaos and
undermine the potential of radio—and, later, television. Accordingly, the
centerpiece of broadcast regulation was exclusive licenses to particular
frequencies for broadcasters who, in exchange for this acquisition of a
quasi-property right in the publicly owned radio spectrum, would have
certain public service obligations.
Technology has changed that. Improvements in radio transmitter and
receiver technology made higher frequencies available, which pose less
risk of interference because of their short range. Analog to digital
encoding of sounds and pictures opened up new ways to multiplex
different signals on the same frequency. Spread spectrum and frequency
hopping modulation schemes expand frequency sharing further. Multiple
transmitters use the same cluster of very narrow slices of spectrum
simultaneously by splitting up their signals and sending small pieces of
them on different frequency slices, none lasting more than a few
milliseconds. As the transmitters bounce around in the frequency block,
they avoid each other, or when the pieces collide, the adverse effect on
the overall flow of content is small and tolerable. Cell phone switching
fabrics and highly directional antennas couple with relatively low-power
transmitters and a multiplicity of cell sites make it possible for thousands
of users to share the same frequencies by automatically switching from
one collocated transceiver or cell site to another.
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F. Spectrum Realignment
Electromagnetic radiation, such as radio and television broadcast
signals, occupies radio spectrum. The radio spectrum covers frequencies
ranging from 10 KHz to 300 GHz, equivalent to wavelengths of 100,000
km to 1 mm.66 Signals at different frequencies move through space
(propagate) differently. Lower frequency signals travels for hundreds or
thousands of miles over and under the Earth’s surface. High frequency
signals (1.6 to 30 MHz) bounce off layers of the ionosphere and return to
earth hundreds or thousands of miles away. VHF, UHF, and microwave
frequencies penetrate the ionosphere and are limited to receivers within
line of sight.67
Under U.S. law, no one may transmit radio signals without a license
from the FCC.68 The growth in video uses of the Internet, including
viewing on mobile devices, has necessitated additional spectrum for
broadband wireless providers. Spectrum for this purpose has been
reallocated through spectrum auctions and through implementation of
digital television.
Congress gave the FCC authority to organize spectrum auctions in
1993.69 The first auctions were intended to make spectrum available for
new uses of cellular telephone technology, known at the time as “PCS”—
personal communications services.70 PCS used digital signals, unlike
cellular telephone service, which was predominantly analog at the time.
“Broadband PCS also is used for new wireless Internet services,”71 one
commentator explained at the time.
Fifteen years later, the President, the FCC, and the Congress
recognized that, while spectrum auctions had been largely successful in
making additional spectrum available for broadband wireless, further
deployment was limited by the unavailability of further spectrum to
auction. New methods had to be found, beyond the FCC’s authority to
revoke existing licenses, to free up additional spectrum to be auctioned.72
The FCC targeted spectrum between 225 MHz and 3.7 GHz for
66. John Norgard, The Electromagnetic Spectrum, Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, Eng’g
Handbook, 6-7 (Edmund A. Williams et al. eds., 10th ed. 2007).
67. THE ARRL HANDBOOK FOR RADIO COMMUNICATIONS ch. 19 (2015) (Propagation of
Radio Signals).
68. 47 U.S.C. § 301.
69. Section 6002(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66,
107 Stat. 312, adding subsection (j) to 47 U.S.C. § 309.
70. Mark W. Munson, A Legacy of Lost Opportunity: Designated Entities and the Federal
Communications Commission's Broadband PCS Spectrum Auction, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 217, 226 (2000-2001) (summarizing history of spectrum auctions).
71. Id. at 227.
72. Jessica Elder, Voluntary Incentive Auctions: The Benefits of a Market-Based Spectrum
Policy, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 163, 171-72 (2011) (explaining the spectrum crunch).
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reallocation, based on its conclusion that these frequencies were best
suited for broadband wireless.73 Those frequencies were mostly occupied
by broadcast television and mobile satellite service (MSS) licensees.74
The wireless industry argued that broadcast television spectrum should
be a particular target for reassignment because:
[O]nly ten percent of U.S. consumers utilize free OTA television
because most consumers choose to subscribe to pay-TV services
that are not delivered through the airwaves. Consequently, . . . a
portion of the broadcast television spectrum should be repurposed
for mobile broadband because the benefits of over-the-air
broadcast can be enjoyed by virtually every American citizen
without the use of over-the-air broadcast spectrum.75
Even if this was to be done, something was necessary other than
traditional methods, which “revisiting and revising process takes an
average of six to thirteen years and forcible spectrum repurposing faces
seemingly interminable judicial review.”76
The answer recommended by commentators and the FCC was
broadband incentive auctions.77 “The auction presents a once-in-alifetime opportunity for broadcasters,” the FCC said in its 2014 Report
and Order on the incentive auction policy.78 “Payments to broadcasters
that participate in the reverse auction can strengthen broadcasting by
funding new content, services, and delivery mechanisms”79 The auction,
scheduled to begin on March 29, 2016,80 is designed to allow the holders
of FCC licenses for 38-6 MHz UHF channels to volunteer to give up their
spectrum assignments in exchange for substantial payments estimated to
be in the hundreds of millions of dollars per station.81 The United States
73. Id. at 172.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 174 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
76. Id. at 175.
77. Id. at 179-86 (analyzing emergence of legislation).
78. FCC, In the Matter of Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of
Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, FCC 14-50, GN Docket No. 12-268, at 4 (June 2, 2014),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-rules-first-ever-incentive-auction.
79. Id.
80. FCC, Broadcast Incentive Auction, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/fcc-initiatives/
incentive-auctions.
81. Grant Gross, FCC: Some TV stations could earn huge dollars in spectrum auction,
COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2690553/networkinghardware/fcc-some-tv-stations-could-earn-huge-dollars-in-spectrum-auction.html. (Speculating
that some television stations could earn as much as $400 million per station by auctioning off their
VHF frequency assignments in major markets); David Oxenford, TV Incentive Auction Moves
Forward – FCC Estimates the Value of TV Stations and Clarifies the Interference Standard for
Stations Who Remain After the Auction, BROADCAST LAW BLOG (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.broad
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Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied review of the FCC order in
June, 2015.82
The purpose of the auction is to facilitate rationalization of UHF
spectrum to provide more bandwidth for digital communication systems
such as broadband wireless Internet access.83
No one knows how many legacy TV stations will elect to participate
in the auction.84 Under the FCC’s rules for the auction, it will not disclose
which stations sign up for the auction; their identities will remain
confidential for two years after the auction is complete.85
Many profitable large market stations will sit on the sidelines. But the
number of stations that must relinquish frequency assignments to free up
the spectrum the FCC needs for new uses is substantial. Less profitable
stations are, even now, evaluating their options. They may elect to sit it
out, as well. Or, they may shift to new over-the-air frequencies; they may
go off the air all together; or they may elect to become Internet only TV
stations by shutting down their boomers or by converting them to ATSC
3.0.86 The auction will allow spectrum for broadband wireless to grow
further.
All U.S. TV stations completed the transition from analog
transmissions using the NTSC standard to digital transmissions using the
ATSC standard in 2009.87 The conversion required stations to change
frequency assignments to free up spectrum for public safety and
broadband wireless application.88
castlawblog.com/2014/10/articles/tv-incentive-auction-moves-forward-fcc-estimates-the-valueof-tv-stations-and-clarifies-the-interference-standard-for-stations-who-remain-after-the-auction/
(Reporting on FCC report on station value).
82. National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC, 789 F.3d 165 (2015) (rejecting
arguments by TV broadcaster trade association that FCC approach failed to protect existing
stations’ market areas).
83. FCC 2014 R&O at 4 (summarizing purpose of auction); FCC, 2015 Video Competition
Report 76, ¶ 165 (explaining repacking).
84. See generally NAB: no. of volunteers needed, http://www.nab.org/spectrumAuctions/
participationbyMarket.asp
85. In the Matter of Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum
Through Incentive Auctions, FCC 14-50, GN Docket No. 12-268 at 165-66 (Report and Order
June 2, 2014), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-14-50A1.pdf [hereinafter
Broadcast Incentive Auction Report and Order] (explaining that disclosure of participants could
adversely affect investors and advertisers).
86. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Uber Television: Internet-Only Television Stations, 23 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 65-132 (2016).
87. All radio signals are analog, but can be modulated by information encoded digitally.
Indeed, the first radio communications were digital, because Morse Code is digital: the carrier
radio signal is either on (1) or off (0).
88. FCC, Digital Television, https://www.fcc.gov/general/digital-television (describing
advantages of digital television, the statutory mandate to use its technology exclusively, and the
motivate to free up spectrum for public safety and broadband wireless); compare Brett Jenkins &
John Freberg, Digital Television Transmitters, NAB Handbook at 1535 (providing brief history
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G. ATSC 3.0
A television industry standard, ATSC 3.0, will permit television
broadcasters to join cable internet access providers, DSL providers and
mobile broadband wireless as distributors of video content moving
through the Internet.
Each time an Internet packet traverses a router, the router must process
it by looking up its address field in a routing table and determining where
to send it next. This is an extremely inefficient way of transferring the
same information to multiple users, as by sending camera imagery and
commentator discussion at the Super Bowl to tens of millions of viewers
who want to watch the same game at the same time Using the traditional
router mesh all the way from origin to all the users necessitates hundreds
of millions of router processing cycles—the more recipients the more
processing. Major e-commerce enterprises like Google recognize this and
use load-balancing algorithms to decentralize the routing of the most
popular information, caching it (stockpiling it) on regional servers to
reduce the number of hops required to get information to users who have
requested it.
Far better would be a protocol that subdivides the Super Bowl stream
so that it is broadcast to closely clustered, multiple viewers, rather than
being processed, packet-by-packet, through multiple routers. For the
Super Bowl, and other popular programming, the packets representing
the live program would be sent to radio transmitters for the last hop89 to
multiple users.
The television industry’s standards organizations embrace this vision
and are working on ATSC 3.0 to make it a reality. ATSC 2.0, adopted by
the FCC as a standard for digital television, already uses the Internet
Protocol to packetize information before it is sent to transmitters. ATSC
3.0 goes considerably further. It “is designed to accommodate and extend
the existing high-power/tall-tower broadcast infrastructure and
associated business models, while, for the first time, supporting delivery
of robust vehicular and pedestrian mobile television and other data
services to all portable devices.”90
It will enable

of digital television and its standards) with Jay C. Adrick, Analog Television Transmitters, NAB
Handbook at 1481 (describing analog transmission systems).
89. The movement between each pair of routers is referred to colloquially as a “hop.” For
example, the packets comprising an ABC7 Chicago newscast the author watched on January 26,
2016 moved through 11 distinct routers, two of them near Las Vegas, before connecting back to
ABC7’s infrastructure in Chicago. Traceroute from the author’s computer to abc7chicago.com,
performed at 1312 on Jan. 26, 2016.
90. One Media Open Network Enabled, http://onemediallc.com/.
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a broadcast infrastructure that can deliver both traditional linear
television programming with exceptional, ultra-high definition
capability receivable deep inside buildings and to portable and
mobile devices and also data services that require broadcasting’s
enormously efficient one-to-many architecture. . . . The
addressable feature of the transmission facilitates coding that will
permit unique geographical “zoning” of programming, advertising
and data services, supporting expansion of services that
broadcasters can offer.91
The diagram on the home page of ONEMedia portrays a radio antenna
sending signals to PCs, tablets, smartphones and convention TV
monitors, containing “hyperlocal” zoned ads, distance learning,
agriculture information, public safety, and navigation maps with traffic.92
ONE Media, LLC is a joint venture between Coherent Logix and Sinclair
Broadcast Group, with a central role in developing the ATSC 3.0
standard. Its chief technology officer, Kevin Gage, was Chief Technology
Officer of the NAB and founder of NAB labs.93
Under a prototype demonstrated at the April, 2015 NAB trade show,
the UHF transmitter sent a UHF signal to a home gateway, which
processed it and sent it on to user computers and video screens through a
conventional WiFi connection.94 The FCC granted ONEMedia temporary
special authority to test a full-power prototype of the base elements of
ATSC 3.0 in the Baltimore Washington area, beginning in 2016.95
Indeed, one of the realizations that drove the development of the
content of the ATSC 2.0 and 3.0 standards was the realization that most
viewers prefer to watch TV programming, except for sports,
asynchronously rather than having to be available when the program is
streamed. Most cable providers already provide this capability through
their equipment they provide to subscribers. The ATSC 2.0 and 3.0
standard provide some more capability for signals received over the year.
Internet service contracts provide more download bandwidth than
upload bandwidth, precisely because Internet users watch so much video
through their Internet connections. The NTSC 3.0 standard extends this
concept by allowing the download circuit to be unbundled from the
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. About Us, ONEMEDIA http://onemediallc.com/about-us/.
94. ONEMedia, Demonstration, National Association of Broadcasters Convention, Wynn
Hotel, Apr. 13-15, 2015, http://onemediallc.com/files/NAB%20Demo%20Schematic%20
FINAL%2004092015.pdf.
95. Press Release, ONEMedia, One Media to Test and Operate Next Generation Broadcast
Platform in Washington/Baltimore (Sept. 3, 2015), http://onemediallc.com/files/Press-ReleaseSFN-STA-Final-090215.pdf.
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upload circuit. In other words, a viewer sends requests via a conventional
Internet connection, and TV stations send the requested material by
broadcasting it.96 Most Internet connections multiplex packages intended
for different destinations. Routers and network interface cards select the
packets intended for a particular user. The same thing occurs in a ATSC
3.0 digital broadcast stream. Programming intended for a particular user
has a tag associated with that user permitting it to be detected and
received by him, alone.
Television stations and cable distributors have always been
competitors; they provide alternative tubes through which TV content can
flow. Since the cable plant was built out by turn of the 21st-century,
viewers have progressively shifted to cable and away from over the air
reception. The ATSC 3.0 standard, if it is widely adopted, will reignite
the competition. Viewers wanting to cut the cord to their cable company
will be able to get much of the same functionality and eventually much
of the same content through over the air radio signals from local
television stations.
Whether the same range of programming, is available through ATSC
3.0 depends upon how aggressively television stations and networks seek
syndication arrangements as broad as cable providers have, and, of
course, whether TV stations make deals with cable-only networks like
HBO.
If consumers embrace a return to over the air reception, content
producers have an incentive to make their content available through as
many distribution tubes as exists. On the other hand, the owners of
competing tubes, especially cable roadband wireless digital data services
have an incentive to erect barriers to a general move to over the air
reception. Cable providers already negotiate for exclusivity in licensing
agreements, and they will intensify these efforts.
Most profoundly, ATSC 3.0 makes it possible for over the air
television to become subscription-based, using essentially the same
technologies that cable providers use to permit only paid subscribers to
receive the signals that travel through their cables.
Technology for the physical layer of ATSC 3.0—the definition of the
signal—became a “Candidate Standard” in late 2015, and expected to be
adopted formally in March, 2016.97 The ATSC 3.0 physical layer was
tested at the 2016 Consumer Electronics Show. The tests involved highdynamic range, over-the-air 4KTV signals picked up by prototype

96. Such asymmetrical distribution already is employed by direct broadcast distributors.
FCC, 2015 Video Competition Report, ¶ 114, at 49.
97. Deborah D. McAdams, HPA 2016: ATSC 3.0 Update: New Standard Looks like a
Bigger, Badder Internet, TVTECHNOLOGY (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.tvtechnology.com/news/
0002/hpa-2016-atsc-30-update/277950.
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receivers.98
Upstream, at the presentation layer of the OSI stack, ATSC 3.0 will
use HEVC Main 10 profile compression, which provides a 35-50%
performance gain over AVC/H.264, and has roughly twice the efficiency
of the compression technology used in ATSC 1.0. The HDR technology
specification for the A/341 ATSC Video Candidate Standard is expected
to be selected by July 31, 2016.99
The industry has put ATSC 3.0 on a fast track to coincide with the
FCC’s TV spectrum incentive auction. The goal is to have the standard
ready in time for the post-auction channel repack.100 The standard’s
developers expect that broadcasters will petition the FCC to approve
ATSC 3.0 for use as part of the spectrum repacking initiative of which
the Broadcast Incentive Auction is a part.101
Important architectural and compatibility issues must be resolved
before ATSC 3.0 joins the large family of Internet related standards. One
important barrier to widespread adoption is the inability of most TV
receivers to handle ATSC 3.0 signals. While the FCC mandated TV
receiver manufacturers to handle the initial digital TV standard, ATSC
1.0, it is not expected to do the same for ATSC 3.0, even though it
welcomes deployment of ATSC 3.0 because of its greater spectral
efficiency.102 ATSC 3.0 broadcasters may provide set-top boxes that
translate the ATSC 3.0 signals so that ATSC 1.0-compliant receivers can
display them.103
Internet routing system must make rational decisions about when a
packet should be routed to the next router-to-router link, and when it
should be routed directly to viewers through a high-power radio
transmitter.104 Switched digital video (SDV) transmits only those
programs being received by a group of subscribers. The result is much
like multicasting through the Internet. Nearly half of cable distributors in
high-density markets employ SDV.105
ATSC 3.0 puts broadcasters into the wireless Internet access business.
ATSC 3.0 is bi-directional, and asymmetrical, requiring a fat pipe—
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Mark Richer, President’s Memo: Ushering in a New Era in Television, ATSC (Jan.
2016), http://atsc.org/newsletter/presidents-memo-ushering-in-a-new-era-in-television/.
102. McAdams, supra note 97.
103. Id.
104. Id. (using the phrase “high-power radio transmitter” to refer to existing or similar
television transmitters and antennas, because the sense of the discussion distinguishes that means
of communication from other wireless links like cellular and Wi-Fi, which also use radio
transmitters, but much less powerful ones.).
105. FCC, supra note 53, ¶ 80, at 36.
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boomer TV transmitters and antennas to download content—and a skinny
pipe to bring back the interactive requests.106
IPTV has a head start, because multicasting already is in wide use to
feed wireless customer appetites for streaming video. ATSC 3.0 is still in
the prototype phases. But the level of resources available from both, from
the broadcast side’s ATSC 3.0 and from the wireless carrier side’s IPTV,
mean that both are likely to reach fruition and be generally deployed—
barring some unpleasant grounding on unforeseen implementation
problems.
The result will be a future Internet architecture, through which
virtually all television programming moves, but an architecture with a
new addition, one represented by genuine omnidirectional broadcasts at
the edge rather than packet by packet processing and cell phone tower
switching. There is no reason to believe that one will eclipse the other.
They will remain as alternatives, with suppliers making judgment
according to the relative costs of a broadcast with one-to-one backhaul as
compared with faster and more complex signaling and switching systems.
H. Targeted Advertising
Targeted advertising,107 as a supplement or substitute for traditional
mass-market advertising, is proving its worth to both advertisers and
consumers. Targeted advertising, available for more than twenty years,108
delivers advertising content to individual users of the Internet depending
on data indicating their interests and purchasing behavior.109 “[It] permits
advertisers to target online advertisements only to those consumers fitting
desired demographic, geographic and ‘psychographic’ criteria,”110 or
engaging in certain online behavior:
[I]f the user is using the computer to search for information on
stocks, then client software . . . can detect this (whether by
106. Email from Fred Baumgartner to author (Feb. 1, 2016) (on file with author).
107. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009).
108. See Reception system for an interactive computer network and method of operation,
U.S. Patent No. 5,347,632 (filed July 28, 1989) (issued Sep. 13, 1994) (claiming basic components
of targeted advertising system).
109. The process is described in Computer Interface Method and Apparatus With Targeted
Advertising, U.S. Patent No. 6,628,314 (filed Oct. 30, 2000) (issued Sept. 30, 2003) [hereinafter
Patent 314], ruled invalid by Facebook, Inc. v. B.E. Technology, LLC, Case IPR2014-00052,
Patent 6, 628, 314, 2015 WL 1735098 (Patent Tr. & App. Bd. Mar. 31, 2015) (Ad servers and the
databases on which they rely typically do not maintain data about individuals, but rather on
behavioral clusters. Individuals are tagged with a multiplicity of behavioral clusters that their past
behavior links them to). See Patent 314, supra, at 15 (explaining behavioral categories).
110. Morsa v. Facebook, Inc., 77 F. Supp.3d 1007, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (describing
subject matter of patent).

2017]

KEEPING THE INTERNET INVISIBLE: TELEVISION TAKES OVER

153

recognizing the web site being accessed, the keywords used in the
web pages being accessed, the program being executed, or some
other aspect of the user’s search) and can display an advertisement
that is relevant to this topic, whether it be for a stock brokerage, a
stock exchange, an investment group, or some other
organization.111
Data intermediaries collect large quantities of data about the behavior
of everyone who uses the Internet. Google, for example, records every
search request and every page visited. Amazon keeps track of book
purchasing and browsing. Airline, lodging and entertainment venues, and
retailers keep track of purchases. Some of these enterprises sell their data
to intermediaries called “data brokers” like Acxiom and Experian.112
Other intermediaries function as specialized advertising agencies.
They accept or help craft ad content and undertake to place the ads
according to profiles submitted by the advertiser. For example, an
advertiser might want to serve ads about drones to everyone who has
shown an interest in drones in the past through their web browsing
behavior.113 Or, the distributor of blood pressure medication might want
to serve ads to anyone who has searched for information about
hypertension and blood pressure.
When an Internet user clicks on a website, the user’s IP address and
other available identifying information is sent invisibly to an ad server,
usually by means of a “cookie.” While the web server the user is visiting
(the content server) is preparing the requested webpage, the ad server
quickly looks up the user and matches her profile with the specifications
provided to the ad agency by the advertiser. The data stores generally do
not track individual users, but rather group them into clusters of users
with similar interests and behaviors. A simpler system avoids the
behavioral databases and serves ads according to their relationship with
the particular page a user has requested.114
Then the ad server (or the content server) inserts the ad into the
requested page and sends it to the requester. Obviously, the infrastructure
supporting the system must be quick in its data look-up, programmed
decision-making, and transmission of ads to avoid unacceptable delays to
the user.115
111. Patent 314, supra note 109, at 16.
112. See generally In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litigation, 140 F.Supp.3d 922,926-28
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2015) (describing how website visits use cookies to direct targeted
advertising).
113. Patent 314, supra note 109, at 15 (describing category identifiers associated with ad
content).
114. Id. at 16 (describing “reactive targeting”).
115. See Why Internet Users Abandon Digital Videos, EMARKETER (Jan. 4, 2016),
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The result is an advertising market that is more acceptable to users
than one that interposes ads for products and services the user has no
interest in.116 Targeted advertising is available to very small businesses,
because the pricing is adjustable and flexible—pay-per-impression or
pay-per-click—are common options, under which the advertiser pays
only for the ads actually served and, in many cases, only when a target
clicks on the ad. Its fine granularity and low-price thresholds have the
potential to bring many more advertisers into the market. It is relatively
easy to place a targeted ad on Google, Amazon, Facebook, and other large
scale e-commerce and social networking sites.117
Google’s Adsense, for example, permits content sites to sign up for
the service with a few minutes’ interaction on its website. The host site
has complete freedom to design where ads appear on its pages. “Block
ads you don’t want, choose where ads appear, and change the look and
feel of text ads to match your site. You can even control the categories of
ads you allow. Your site. Your rules.”118 Google takes complete
responsibility for ad revenue accounting, processing payments from
advertisers and periodically sending direct deposits to the host’s bank
account. Google reports that it paid out nearly $10 billion in ad revenue
to its AdSense customers.119
Various reports indicate that Google pays out about 75% in ad revenue
to those hosting its ads,120 and Google itself recommends that ad
developers share 75-100% of the revenue with advertising hosts.121
Targeted advertising is, of course unavailable for over-the-air, cable, and
satellite distribution of television programming, but is available on legacy
station websites. Internet only television stations are likely to exploit the
possibilities more thoroughly. They will have more of their content on
the Internet than legacy stations, thus providing more opportunities for ad
http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Why-Internet-Users-Abandon-Digital-Videos/1013415
(summarizing research showing that 61.8% of users skip videos that have too many ads; 51.3%
skip if the video buffers more than once, 26.7% skip if an add appears before the video and cannot
be skipped; and 16.4% skip if an ad appears before the video).
116. See Katy Bachman, Poll: Targeted Advertising is Not the Bogeyman [Updated] Nearly
70% like at Least some Tailored Internet Ads, ADWEEK (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.adweek.com/
news/technology/poll-targeted-advertising-not-bogeyman-updated-148 649.
117. See Kate McFarlin, How to Advertise on a GoDaddy Parked Page, HOUSTON CHRON.,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/advertise-godaddy-parked-11256.html (describing process for
enabling targeted advertising on domain names established with popular domain registrar);
FACEBOOK, How to Target Facebook Ads, https://www. facebook.com/business/a/onlinesales/ad-targeting-details/ (describing how to use targeted advertising on Facebook).
118. Google AdSense, Benefits, https://www.google.com/adsense/ start/benefits/.
119. Id.
120. Amit Agarwal, The Revenue Share of Google AdSense Publishers, DIGITAL
INSPIRATION (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.labnol.org/internet/adsense-revenue-share/12531/.
121. AdSense Host API, Flexible Revenue Sharing, https://developers.google.com/
adsense/host/revenuesharing.
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placement. Legacy producers have been slow and clumsy in their use of
Internet advertising, however,122 although television stations do a better
job than many newspapers. The Chicago Tribune, for example, places
full-screen ads that cover up the requested content, and the content of
these ads only sporadically aligns with user interests.123 More effective
page design inserts graphical ads at the margins of requested pages
without obscuring requested content.124 When they are closely aligned
with user interests, they may appear to be part of the requested page itself,
increasing the likelihood of a click through.
The trend is away from CPM-based advertising rates, common for
broadcast television, toward performance based rates, typical for targeted
advertising.125 The shift toward targeted advertising has engendered
battles among advertisers, advertising platform vendors, and consumer
advocates. Controversy over efforts to patent targeted advertising
systems has been fierce among participants and would-be participants in
the system.126 Privacy advocates have aggressively challenged targeted
advertising on invasion-of-privacy grounds, but generally have been
unsuccessful.127
Programmers want to attach their ads to their programming so they
cannot be stripped off and discarded by viewers or stripped off and
replaced by ads sold by others in the chain. In this respect, programmers
have a mixed view of targeted advertising. If they can control ad
placement and get the benefits of targeting technology, their position to
obtain advertising revenue is enhanced. On the other hand, if someone
else further down in the chain controls ad placement, the programmers
lose control of their advertising, and advertisers are likely to split their ad
payments between the programmer and the downstream host. One of the
advantages of targeted advertising is that it relieves the ad platform of the
cost of soliciting advertisers. TV stations already have the marketing
122. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Beyond ‘Star Wars,’ a Dark Force Looms for Disney: CordCutting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2015 (arguing that Disney’s ESPN is in financial trouble because
it has not joined other networks in streaming to Internet, and Internet subscription fees cannot
cover “the enormous cost of licensing live sports programing”).
123. See Chicago Tribune, Breaking News, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
breaking/.
124. Patent 314, supra note 109, at 4 (describing “ad region” of page displayed to user).
125. FCC, supra note 53, ¶ 294, at 140.
126. See Morsa, 77 F. Supp.3d at 1016 (rejecting claim for infringement of targeted
advertising patent because patent covered only abstract concept); B.E. Technology, LLC v.
Groupon, Inc., 957 F. Supp.2d 939 (W.D. Tenn. 2013) (denying motion to transfer infringement
case involving targeted advertising patent); Facebook, Inc. v. B.E. Technology, LLC, Case
IPR2014-00052, 2015 WL 1735098 (Patent Tr. & App. Bd. Mar. 31, 2015) (invalidating Patent
6,628,314 involving targeted advertising).
127. In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litigation, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (rejecting privacyinvasion claims by Facebook users for lack of injury-in-fact standing).
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infrastructure necessary to solicit advertisers, and so in that respect, a
shift to targeted advertising does not benefit them as much as it benefits
their new-entrant competitors. New-entrant competitors embrace targeted
advertising to reduce economic barriers to entry.
If television stations regain control of the distribution of their
programming, prying viewers away from cable, DSL, and broadband
wireless distributors, they secure their control of advertising, whether it
is of the traditional kind or targeted.
VI. MARKETS
The market structure for communications is in a constant state of flux.
New technologies such as the Internet fragment industry structure for a
while, and then there is a period of reconsolidation along new lines.
Much has changed in ten years, since the Act was adopted. The battle
was largely by the telephone companies, but they transformed themselves
in the process, concentrating on providing the core infrastructure, and
leaving it to others to provide consumer premises equipment. The CLECs
are all gone, either liquidated and bankruptcy or absorbed into the legacy
telephone companies. The fragments of the AT&T breakup eventually
consolidated into two major telephone enterprises, AT&T and Verizon,
one descendent of some of the CLECs–Sprint—and one remnant of a
startup—T-Mobile.
The regional cable companies have consolidated even more into one
behemoth Comcast and a couple of duopolistic competitors, mainly Time
Warner. The main vision of 1996 is been realized; telephone companies
are offering access to television, and cable companies are selling
telephone service. But the half-vision has taken over the main vision;
increasingly whatever cable television companies do is shifting to the
Internet.
There are 99 national programming networks affiliated with the top 5
cable MVPDs. Comcast alone has ownership interests in 47.128
Some 1400 full power television stations exist in the United States;129
few face competition from more than one or two other broadcasters in
their limited geographic markets. Most TV stations are affiliated with
networks, and all three major networks are owned by entertainment
companies that also own content producers.130 ABC, CBS, NBC provide
affiliated stations was twenty-two hours per week of primetime
programming with additional hours of daytime programming. Fox, My
Network TV, and The CW supply their affiliates with about fifteen hours
128. FCC, supra note 53, ¶ 155, at 71.
129. Id. ¶ 145, at 68.
130. Id. ¶ 155, at 71.
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per week.131
Vertical integration in the cable industry has been dramatic. Most
content production occurs within integrated enterprises that also provide
television programming and distribution; most access to the Internet is
provided by the same enterprises, which also control production and
programming. Comcast has ownership interests in each mode of video
distribution, including OVD.132 Telephone companies, on the other hand,
are not vertically integrated. Neither Verizon or AT&T has ownership
interests in video programming networks.133
Multi-channel Video Programming Distributors (MVPDs) include
cable operators, direct broadcast satellite operators, and telephone
companies.134 At the end of 2013, 36 cable MVPDs, 2 DBS MVPDs, and
2 large telephone MVPDs existed.135 Comcast, Time Warner cable,
Charter communications, Cox Communications, and Cablevision
Systems account for 82% of all cable MVPD subscribers.136 The 2 DBS
providers, DISHnetwork, and DirecTV have a 34% share of the MVPD
market.137 Telephone companies account for about 11% of the market.138
The cable providers rarely compete with each other in the same
geographic area, but are faced with competition by DBS providers and
telephone companies.139 The two direct TV satellite providers compete
with each other across the United States. Verizon and AT&T, for the most
part service distinct geographic areas and hence are monopolists for their
wired services, but compete nationally for their wireless services.
The philosophy of the Act has withstood anti-competitive pressures.
The communications infrastructure of 2017 is private, not subject to any
kind of traditional regulation as it existed in 1995, but not very
competitive with respect to its core attributes. The major players have
found new ways and new technologies to lockout competitors, ranging
from copy protection schemes, overbroad extension of copyright law,
anti-competitive hardware, and a variety of commercial arrangements
that make concerted refusals to deal part of the bargain. The vision now
is more dramatic than it was twenty years before and a bit more
amorphous. Now, the vision is one of seamlessness: anyone should be
able to access any existing content existing anywhere from anywhere, and
he should be able to do it without having to wrestle with climbing many
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. ¶ 148, at 69.
Id. ¶ 159, at 72.
Id. ¶ 120, at 52.
Id. ¶ 16, at 7.
Id. ¶ 17, at 8.
Id. ¶ 25, at 10.
Id. ¶ 26, at 10.
Id. ¶ 27, at 11-12.
Id. ¶ 22, at 9.
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different walls to run around the garden.
The philosophy still opposes detailed government prescription of how
technology should be deployed and used, but pressures are growing to reimpose regulation to reduce perceived threats to personal privacy,
widespread criminal activity on the Internet, state and non-state based
terrorism, and commercial mishaps of enormous scale.
Now the policy goal is to preserve competition among content
producers. That requires assuring competitive access to a concentrated
but competitive structure of programmers. It requires preserving
competition among programmers, which requires assuring competitive
access to content upstream and to distributors, downstream. It also
requires guaranteeing competition among distributors, which requires
assuring competitive access upstream to programmers and to viewers,
downstream. Collaterally, policy seeks to preserve competition among
advertisers in all three of the markets in which they operate.
A. Overview
Television comprises three distinct activities: content production,
programming, and distribution. Content production includes the
traditional tasks of moviemaking: scripting, casting, principal
photography, and editing. It also includes collecting content, as in
capturing imagery and writing stories about news, and producing content
from in-studio activities.
Programming involves selection and arrangement of content—
stitching it together. In Fortnightly, the Supreme Court had to decide
what constitutes “broadcasting” in order to support its conclusion that
CATV systems were not engaged in that activity, but only distribution. It
identified five activities constituting broadcasting—what this article calls
“programming”—selection and procurement of programs to be viewed,
producing programming itself, and converting the visible images and
audible sounds of programs into electronic signals.140 In Teleprompter,
the Supreme Court added program origination, selling advertising, and
interconnecting with other systems as also core activities of the
programming activity.141 It emphasized that programming and
distribution involve distinct activities, even when they are offered as a
bundle to customers.142 The Supreme Court uses the term “origination”
to refer to programming, and the term “reception” to refer to
distribution.143 In Aereo, the Supreme Court associated exercising choice

140.
141.
142.
143.

Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398 (1968).
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 403-04 (1974).
Id. at 405.
Id.
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over what to transmit as a programming activity.144
Distribution takes programed content and makes it available to
viewers. The Aereo Court enhanced understanding of distribution, as the
term is used in this article, by focusing on what it called—communicating
programming to viewers.145
In 2016, public policy focuses on six markets: the market for
programmer acquisition of content; the market for programmer access to
distribution; the market for viewer access to distribution; the market for
advertiser access to programming; the market for advertiser access to
distributors; and the market for advertiser access to viewers.
Some of the markets are external; some are internal. Consolidation
and concentration increases the reliance on internal markets, as
established firms integrate vertically and make deals between producer,
programmer, and distributor through their internal rules, and budgets
rather than by contracting in the marketplace.146 As technology enables
new entrants, the markets become more competitive, and a greater
proportion of transactions occur in external markets.
Understanding the composition of the supplier and customer
communities at each level is not enough. In many cases, what matters
most are market mechanisms for connecting them. How are search costs
to be managed? What kinds of past practices and exclusive dealing
arrangements make it difficult for new entrants to compete? How can new
entrants get access to the necessary channels for delivering their product
to customers? Accordingly, the following sections begin by describing
the composition of each community of suppliers and customers, but then
emphasizes market mechanisms for connecting them.
A variety of content producers deliver their content through the cloud
to a variety of programmers inside the cloud. The programmers package
the content, and develop business models. They then deliver it through a
variety of distribution enterprises to the edge, from which it travels the
last mile to the viewer.
Things are more complicated than this, of course. Some activities
described as content production actually involve acquiring content from
other production enterprises, the ones who actually script, shoot, and edit
movies and TV series. Television networks and stations produce some
content themselves, particularly news. Legacy TV stations also are in the
distribution business through their boomer antennas and transmitters.
The simplified schematic is helpful, however, to illustrate the
144. Am. Broad. Co., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2505 (2014).
145. Id. at 2506 (interpreting the “transmit clause” in the 1976 Act).
146. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (explaining
that firms choose between market transactions –contracting out—and internal transactions—
integration—depending on relative cost); Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as
Government Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 171 (2002) (same).
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anticompetitive incentives. Comcast is the most fully integrated of the big
three, with relatively good balance among its production, programming
and distribution activities. The big three are different in where their
centers of gravity lie. Disney is strong in content production and
programming, but weak in distribution, having only broadcast television
pipes. Comcast is dominant in cable distribution, and strong in content
production, with Universal Studios, and in programming, with NBC.
AT&T provides not only DSL distribution, but with its acquisition of
DirecTV, satellite distribution as well.
The big three are Disney (ABC), National Amusements, an affiliate
of Viacom (CBS), and Comcast (NBC). Other major players include
Time Warner, AT&T, Verizon, and, more recently, Google, Amazon, and
Netflix. The big three are all fully integrated, with holdings in production,
programming, and distribution activities. Time Warner is strong in
content production and distribution, but does not have a TV network.
AT&T and Verizon are primarily distribution enterprises, and lack of
content production and programming. Among the new entrants, Google
and Amazon represent a new wave of programming enterprises; they are
aggressively pushing upstream into content production, and are dipping
their toes in the water for distribution. Netflix is predominantly a
programming enterprise, and is aggressively moving into content
production.147
Microeconomics teaches that perfectly competitive markets are better
at adjusting to change and satisfying buyers and sellers than government
supervision can be. But for this to be true, the markets have to be
“perfect:” so many buyers and sellers that no one can influence price,
perfect information for all participants, and frictionless deal-making.148
None of those conditions prevails and any of the markets for television.
In all six markets, large vertically integrated enterprises, benefiting
from significant economies of scale, compete with much smaller
enterprises specializing in only one activity. The smaller enterprises are
proliferating because of much lower barriers to entry resulting from
dramatically lower prices for equipment and the Internet’s ability to
connect them to other stages of the television value chain. The decreasing
costs of hardware reduce the economies of scale for new entrants. A
multi-million-dollar boomer transmitter and antenna system is not
necessary for a programmer, who now can “broadcast” its content to
147. John Koblan, Netflix Aims for Family-Friendly Nostalgia With New Slate, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/business/media/netflix-aims-for-family-frie
ndly-nostalgia-with-new-slate.html?_r=0 (reviewing Netflix success in original programming).
148. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 504-507 (2002) (discussing
characteristics of perfectly competitive markets); Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect
Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7-12 (1994)
(reviewing characteristics of perfect competition in micro economics).
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viewers through the Internet with the same quality they can obtain over
the air or through a cable television connection. A $3 million helicopter
is not necessary for a news collector that wants aerial imagery; he can use
a $1,200 drone. A $500,000 studio camera is not necessary for a content
producer that makes effective use of a DSLR or GoPro mounted on a $75
tripod.
As the following Parts explain, disruptive technologies are changing
market competitiveness in different ways. Technology is making the
producer-programmer market more competitive. The programmerdistributor market is becoming more competitive on the programmer side
but, on the distributor side, the technologies for high-bandwidth
throughput create incentives that make it more oligopolistic. The
distributor-distributor market is becoming more concentrated and less
competitive as firm size increases to cover the capital costs of specialized,
high bandwidth pipes for video. The distributor-viewer market is
becoming more competitive, though still oligopolistic, with the addition
of more broadband wireless coverage, improvements in bi-directional
satellite connectivity, and the promise of ATSC 3.0.
B. The Six Specific Markets
Each of the following sections describes the current market structure,
emphasizing the degree of concentration and vertical integration for both
sellers and buyers. Each then identifies new entrants and considers the
likely terms of competition, given various anticompetitive motivations.
1. Content-Producer to Programmer
Market analysis begins with content production. The only reason that
the markets for programming and distribution exist is that viewers want
to see the content that these downstream activities provide. In a perfect
market, a content producer would interact directly with its viewer. A
court jester in King Henry II’s time came to court and performed for the
King – his primary viewer.149 No elaborate programming or distribution
mechanism was necessary. Bach performed directly for King
Frederick.150 Later, some differentiation had begun to occur. Shakespeare
did not finance, own, or operate the theaters in which his plays were
performed.151 Mozart did not finance, own, or operate the concert halls in
149. See Medieval Jesters, MEDIEVAL LIFE AND TIMES (Jan. 2017), http://www.medievallife-and-times.info/medieval-life/medieval-jesters.htm.
150. See JAMES R. GAINES, EVENING IN THE PALACE OF REASON: BACH MEETS FREDERICK
THE GREAT IN THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT (2005).
151. Shakespeare's Theatres, SHAKESPEARE ONLINE (2014), http://www.shakespeareonline.com/theatre/.
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which his music was performed.
A twenty-first-century content producer, unlike the court jester, Bach,
and Shakespeare, needs programmers and distributors to reach its
viewers.152 Some content producers make deals with distributors directly,
but for the most part they deal directly with programmers, who, in turn
deal with distributors.
In the traditional market for content, the sellers are content producers,
and the buyers are programmers. Fewer programmers than content
producers exist: the broadcast television networks; the broadcast
television stations; and several dozen cable networks. In other words, the
market is an oligopsony—many sellers and only a few buyers.153
A diverse set of individuals and entities produce television content.
They include large traditional movie studios controlled by Disney and
Time Warner. They include ‘indie” but large budget producers that win
Sundance and Cannes festivals. They include reporters and
photojournalists holding salaried positions with TV networks and TV
stations. New entrants include tens of thousands of genuinely indie movie
makers who usually find no outlet for their art beyond YouTube and
Vimeo. The array of content options available is much more varied than
it was 20 years ago. Millions of YouTube and Vimeo videos are available
to anyone in the world, and some of them have artistic merit. Some
become blockbusters by becoming “viral.”
New content producers also include a growing number of stringer
journalists. Technology is making the producer-programmer market
more competitive. Lower costs and increasing power of digital cameras,
editing software, and crowdsourcing for putting together the elements of
a movie have opened the doors to thousands of additional entertainment
producers. A few large players, new to the content game, are beginning
to mine this lode. Netflix, Hulu, Google, Amazon, and others are actively
soliciting contributions from small, hitherto unknown, entertainment
producers.
Improvements in camera technology, inexpensive drones, and
improved video wireless transmission have put good news gathering tools
in the hands of almost anyone with a nose for news. TV programmers
regularly use stringers and may use more as their tools improve.
At the same time, ubiquitous access to the Internet, and improvements
in video editing software have spawned a new generation of Internet-only
programmers.

152. Patrick Murphy, Retransmission Consent: A Mixed Signal for Cable Copyright, 17
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 237, 238 (1993) (evaluating retransmission consent stating “[t]he value
of television is the value of the programming.”).
153. See In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 248, 600 F.2d 1148,
1154 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying ologipsony concept in antitrust case).
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Despite the decreasing barriers to entry for moviemakers154 and
newsgatherers, various types of market failure blunt the competitive
effect. Search costs for buyers of indie movies are enormous,155 and so
far most programmers have preferred to stick with the large content
producers they already know. Information asymmetry penalizes the new,
smaller sellers, and negotiating a deal with legacy programmers like HBO
or NBC is a daunting undertaking, probably involving substantial
expenditures for agents and lawyers. It surely is not a welcoming activity
for first timers.
Improving the functioning of this market and realizing the new
opportunities the technology affords depends upon the emergence and
growth of new types of intermediation to tie content producers with
programmers. Intermediaries must make it easier for buyers and sellers
to find each other and to make deals. Two essential attributes of such
intermediation exist. First, intermediaries must provide an efficient
means for assessing quality according to articulable criteria. Second, they
must provide standardized alternative terms affording significant choice
for both parties, while sparing them the burden of reinventing each new
deal and rediscovering all the variables that come into play.
As new forms of intermediation crystallize, the flow of content from
the small entities will increase and become more of a factor in the market.
Economies of scale surely exist for making a big-budget action movie,
but are far less important for a compelling documentary or story focused
on human relationships. What matters is not the cost and weight of the
camera, mixing equipment, and editing equipment; each of those is
available for less than $1,000. What matters is creativity in writing the
script and good acting, directing, cinematography, and editing. These
qualities are embedded in the human participants and cannot be
automated effectively, no matter how much money is available to invest
in hardware and software.
It is too early to tell whether asymmetrical market arrangements will
prevail, or whether intermediation that looks more like Facebook,
YouTube, and NewsCastic will evolve into effective ways of finding
good quality content and plugging it into the stream. Anticompetitive
incentives are stronger on the programmer side than on the contentproducer side of the market. Even if one programmer has a dominant
market share, say 80%, the content producer still would like to get
154. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Technologies of Storytelling: New Models for Movies, 10 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 106 (2010).
155. Search costs are large not only because of the large number of in the movie makers,
but also because the quality of their work varies greatly. See Carole Levitt & Mark Rosch, Finding
Entertainment Law Online, From Scholarship to Scandals, 26 L.A. LAW. 54 (2003) (giving
examples of overbroad search results on YouTube). The signal-to-noise ratio for on YouTube and
Vimeo is quite low.
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revenue through the 20% programmers. So content producers have every
incentive to make non-exclusive deals. On the other hand, unless the
content producer produces only one movie, or television show, it has
multiple products some of which will inevitably be more popular than
others. So it does have an incentive to tie the products together so that the
more popular ones pull the less popular ones into greater profitability.156
Programmers understand that viewers will be drawn to their
programming lineups according to the content the lineups offer. If CBS
offers NCIS, and the other three networks do not, more viewers will be
drawn to CBS. For that reason alone, CBS has an incentive to make
exclusive deals with content producers, and thus to become a monopolist
for having NCIS in its programming lineup. But CBS also needs to have
a variety of content; offering only NCIS is not much of a program lineup,
although it might be attractive to that narrow part of the market that wants
to do binge viewing of NCIS. So CBS's incentive is to get exclusive deals
on a wide, but coherent, collection of program content, and it may,
because of the incentives for the content producers to be a part of popular
programming streams.
These anti-competitive incentives for programmers present big
barriers for new entrants wishing to cultivate relationships with
established programmers and new-entrant programmers, and for new
programmer entrants to establish relationships with established content
producers and new programmer entrants. It is difficult for them to gain
admission to the club. Any collusion falls short of explicit agreements to
limit output, they are few enough in number to engage in conscious
parallelism157 on the terms of content licenses, and because of a high
degree of vertical integration, can use the leverage they have in adjacent
markets to punish competitors who ease up on license restrictions, for
example, releasing content to Internet programmers simultaneously with
its release to traditional over-the-air and cable-television programmers.
In the legacy market connecting content producers with programmers,
vertical integration significantly reduces competition. ABC7 Chicago
need not go into the marketplace to license entertainment or national
news content; it simply makes arrangements with its parent ABC
network, or one of the sibling studios within the Disney family. HBO
does not need to shop among a variety of producers for movies and
documentaries; it simply talks to a sibling within Time Warner.
In other cases, long established relationships between programmers
and large content producers limit the competitive energy on both sides; it
156. See Christopher R. Leslie, Tying Conspiracies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2247, 2250
(2007) (explaining anti-competitive effect of tying arrangements).
157. See Matthew M. Bunda, Monsanto, Matsushita, and “Conscious Parallelism”: Towards
a Judicial Resolution of the “Oligopoly Problem,” 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 179, 187 (2006)
(explaining how proof of conscious parallelism provides circumstantial evidence of price fixing).
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is much easier simply to negotiate a renewal of an existing license
agreement—perhaps with different pricing--or to extend it to new content
than to scrutinize competing licensors. Given the uncertainty that
underlies any substantial investment in entertainment, additional
uncertainties about the reliability and artistic vision of new partners is
unwelcome.
The market for connecting content production in the form of news
collection with programmers is mainly avoided by substantial vertical
integration. Most news programmers have their own news collection
teams. Cost pressures are forcing more of them to go into the market and
use stringers as a content source, but the stringer phenomenon operates
only at the margins and through mostly informal relationships between
individual assignment editors and stringers. NewsCastic represents an
interesting new model, in which an independent entity provides the
intermediation between independent news collectors and programmers.
While the initial implementation of NewsCastic focuses on wellestablished television stations, there is no apparent reason why it cannot
easily be extended to smaller, new-entrant programmers.
2. Programmer to Distributor
The programmer-distributor market is becoming more competitive on
the programmer side for the reasons detailed in Part 0 but, on the
distributor side, the technologies for high-bandwidth throughput create
incentives that make it more oligopsonistic. Programmers include
television networks and local TV stations, dozens of cable programmers
such as HBO and ESPN, and a growing community of entities that stitch
together content according to their business visions, intending it to be
distributed through the Internet.
They enter into deals with distributors, sometimes within a vertical
integrated enterprise, as when TV programmers simply send their content
through their stations’ boomer transmitters and antennas, and other times
by negotiating deals with independent distributors such as Comcast,
AT&T, or newer Internet-predominant distributors.
The FCC’s assessment of online video distributors (OVDs) is limited
to entities that offer video content akin to the professional programming
traditionally offered by broadcast stations or broadcast and cable
networks, and which is usually created and produced by media and
entertainment companies using professional grade equipment, talent, and
production crews that hold or maintain the rights for distribution.158 This
is an activity that this article calls “programming.” The FCC identifies
Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Sony, Google, Warner Bros., Netflix, and
158. FCC, supra note 53, ¶ 214, at 100.
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Hulu as major OVD programmers.159 Hulu is jointly owned by NBC, 20th
Century Fox, and Disney.160
Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Amazon did not exist as major
programming enterprises in 1996. Apple and Microsoft existed, but
Apple was just making desktop computers and facing losing market share
so fast it looked like it might go out of business. Microsoft was producing
operating-system and office-productivity software.
At the distribution level, Comcast is in a similar position to CBS: it
will attract subscribers in proportion to the attractiveness of the content
viewers can get through its pipes. For the same reasons as CBS, it is
interested in exclusive deals with the widest possible variety of content.
Coherence doesn't matter as much to Comcast as to CBS.
Both Comcast and CBS want the power to enter into exclusive deals
themselves, while denying that power to their competitors. They do not
want to be locked out of any program content that viewers are willing to
pay for.
The programmers and distributors with the most market power will be
able to get the exclusive deals for the most popular material, and that will
add to their attractiveness, increase their market share, and lead to more
market power to get the next deal. Being able to make exclusive
arrangements is central in this dynamic. One can see that in operation in
the reluctance of major studios to experiment with OTT (over the top)
distributors, because of a concern that would it would disrupt their longterm and highly profitable arrangements with legacy programmers. It is
important to understand in this regard that they must carry and
retransmission consent provisions apply only to programming and not to
the content. Copyright interacts with the statutory puts and calls. If ABC
has an exclusive deal with the NFL, Comcast may have a statutory call
on ABC’s programming stream, but it still has to negotiate with ABC for
rights to the Super Bowl.
Further downstream, in the market for programming, elements of
oligopoly and oligopsony exist as well. Relatively few programmers—
the television networks and the cable networks--exist. They compete with
each other to sell programming, and fewer than a dozen distributors
compete as buyers. The fact that there are 1400 local television stations
does not change this traditional market structure, because they do not
compete in a national market; rather a couple of them may compete with
each other in hundreds of local markets.
Competition in this market is increased, however, by the inherent
nature of Internet distribution. A programmer can make a deal with a
provider of Internet connectivity and send its programming wherever it
159. Id. ¶¶ 221-31, at 103-08.
160. Id. ¶ 231, at 108.
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wants. But that possibility depends upon the Internet connectivity
providers’ being willing to accept programming from anyone, on equal
terms, and to let it go wherever the programmer wants to send it, again
on equal terms. The refusal of major connection services like Comcast to
do that was the stimulus for the net neutrality movement.
The depths and nature of the programming activity differ depending
on the type of content. The programming activity adds considerable value
when the content is news. News occurs and producers capture it as
discrete events. Traditionally, viewers expected TV networks and
stations to stitch the event-specific packages into a newscast, in which the
programming entity decides what is news, controls the sequence in which
events are presented, and determines the pace, with the goal of holding
viewers through the entire newscast. Movement of news dissemination to
the Web increasingly allows viewers to consume these event-specific
packages one at a time, but tradition and habit prolongs the life of
traditional newscasts at specific times of the day.
The same goal—holding viewers—informs entertainment
programming, as well. Programmers assemble their daily schedules to
use the gravitational pull of the most popular programs to cause viewers
to pick their channels and then rely on the transaction costs of changing
channels to retain the viewers for the advertising carried by less popular
content. Viewer desire to consume entertainment when they want to
rather than when the programmer wants is gradually eroding traditional
programming models for entertainment content. Viewers prefer to be able
to select content on an episode by episode basis, rather than having to be
“tuned in” to a particular channel at a particular time. As programmers
accede to this demand, and content producers leapfrog the programmers
altogether, programmers end up doing a little more than selecting pieces
of content to be made available under their brands; they do not do much
stitching together anymore. To a lesser extent, the same thing is true of
news programming; viewers are shifting away from watching newscasts,
and instead go to a trusted news website where they pick and choose the
stories that interest them. Selection and arrangement of the stories to be
displayed remains important, however.161
Here is what one millennial said:
I grew up with my father reading the Wall Street Journal cover to
cover, every day. As I grew older I would pick it up and read an
article or two before starting the day – specially on weekends. We
frequently watched the world news in the evenings as Mom cooked
dinner if we were inside which was rare in the good weather
161. See Community Tool Box, Section 4, Arranging News and Features,
http://ctb.ku.edu/en/table-of-contents/participation/promoting-interest/news-feature-stories/main
(explaining importance of good selection and arrangement of news stories).
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months. Now I get only about 10% of my news from watching a
traditional TV newscast. But every day, I spent an hour or so on
the Apple or Microsoft Windows news app. I’ve configured both
of them to include the news sources I want which includes the WSJ
and NYT feeds as well as so many others, being I wouldn’t
subscribe to if the only method I could obtain the content was via
hardcopy.
I end up “bingeing” on news. (laughs). I’ll go in to check the
headlines, read one story, and see something else, maybe in the
trending list or in the "related stories section that pulls me in. So I
read one of those stories, and they lead me somewhere else. I end
up having to tear myself away to get back to work. It’s great if
you’re in a particular mood for the day you can focus on
technology stories or maybe politics, but the highlight packages
are great to get what is the must know about stories of the day.
The effect is just like “hook and hold” in traditional news
programming. But instead of forcing me to follow the sequence
designed by the news director, I determine what “hooks” me, and
then what “holds” my interest.
From a news programming standpoint, it’s the same thing,
although it involves more shared responsibility. When someone
designs a news website she makes news judgments about what
may hold my interest and what is likely to pull me from one story
to another. The same rules of thumb about accidents, murders, and
disasters being the strongest hooks still apply, as does the idea that
hard hooks are most naturally followed by longer-form analysis,
and then by softer longer human interest material. But ultimately,
I decide. I get to choose whether I want hard hooks first and then
human interest or analysis, or whether I just want to jump from one
hard news item to another.
I don’t agree that the programming activity is thinning out; it’s just
changing. Decisions about sequencing are shared between news
programmer and viewer, and automated selection and sequencing
devices, like trending algorithms, are more a part of the process.162
The thinning out of the programming activity affects analysis of the
market connecting buyers or sellers of content. In the
162. Interview with Eliot O. Sprague, Helicopter Pilot, U.S. Helicopters, Inc., (Feb. 20
2016).
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producer/programmer market, the trend reduces the bargaining power of
programmers, as content producers can threaten to leapfrog them and
make deals directly with distributors.
In the programmer/distributor market, programmer bargaining power
similarly is weaker, because distributors can threaten to make deals
directly with content producers. The programmer/distributor market is an
oligopsony,163 but the new entrants are making it more competitive.
But the absorption of virtually all long-distance communication into
the Internet profoundly alters the architecture of distribution and opens it
to competition. Technically, any programmer can access any distribution
path, simply by addressing its Internet packets appropriately. The Internet
routing protocols inherently seek the best path without regard to the
originator of the content.
It is, however, possible to program routers to exclude certain
originators, and that is the concern of the Net Neutrality concept. Multiple
motivations for anticompetitive behavior by distributors exist. Suppliers
of pipes want to tie customers to their Internet connections by offering
access to content viewers can get nowhere else. This leads the pipe
providers to seek exclusive deals with their content providers, or as is the
case with vertically integrated firms, to license their content to no other
pipe providers.
Programmers, however, can make more money if they all have nonexclusive deals with multiple pipes. Vertically integrated programmers
have another anticompetitive incentive: they want to protect their own
content from competition. This is the evil the FCC’s net neutrality rule
aims to thwart. Net neutrality insists that pipe providers not discriminate
against content based on its source. In a perfectly competitive market,
pipe providers would be happy to carry anyone’s content; the more
content they have, the more subscribers they will attract. But that is true
only if they offer something that competing pipes do not offer; hence the
incentive for exclusive deals.
Programmers are concerned about competition from other
programmers. Thus, their ideal deal with each pipe would lock out their
competitors from that pipe. If CBS makes a deal to pay $1 billion to carry
NFL/AFC football games for a season, it does not want ABC, NBC, or
Fox to carry the same games. If all the networks carry the same games,
the advertisers will split their advertising payments among them. If only
one TV network carries them, all the advertising dollars will go to that
network. If Disney, for example, can strike a deal with Verizon under
which Verizon agrees to bar original productions from Netflix and
Amazon, Disney protects itself from those competitors. The FCC’s 2015
163. See Oligopsony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). An oligopsony is a market
with many sellers but only a few buyers.
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ONO report cites concrete examples of anticompetitive behavior.164
The success of an OVD depends on the willingness of content
producers to license content to them. They have proven reluctant to do so
in many cases because of concern about the effect on their existing
channels of distribution.165 Vertical integration and exclusivity
arrangements involving cable networks, broadcast networks, and BPDs
often lock out unaffiliated OVDs.166 Costs also are significant. Netflix,
for example was paying $7.3 billion for content for its online streaming
services, as of the end of 2013.167
The battle now is likely to shift to the broadband wireless and to ATSC
3.0 markets. Substantial investment is required to make ATSC 3.0 and
mobile IPTV realities, and the providers of those enhanced pipes want to
be able to charge as much as possible. The providers have two
opportunities to do this. First, they can charge subscribers more for
access, enforcing the pricing arrangement by set-top boxes for ATSC 3.0
and mobile hardware for IPTV that limits access depending on the
subscription level.
Second, they can charge content providers more for higher capacity
pipes, or, which is the same economically, negotiate discounts in the
licensing fees they otherwise would pay for the most popular content. The
mechanisms for connecting programmers with distributors are mostly not
market based; many occur within vertically integrated enterprises like
Comcast and Time Warner. HBO arranges with Comcast cable TV to
carry its programming, according to internal rules, budgets, and overall
enterprise strategy. Of course, legacy television stations distribute their
own programming through boomer transmitters and antennas. Deals
between programmers and DSL distributors do occur in the market,
because telephone companies are less vertically integrated than cable TV
distributors.
Demonstrated efforts to exclude competing programmers from
distribution gave rise to merger conditions168 and to the net neutrality
rule.169 Conceptually, net neutrality entitles new entrant programmers to
164. FCC, In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 1428, para. 19 (Mar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Open Network Order] (summarizing record evidence of
undesirable practices showing need for order).
165. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF
COMPETITION IN THE MARKET FOR THE DELIVERY OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING, SIXTEENTH REPORT
117 (2015) [hereinafter FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT].
166. Id. at 119.
167. Id. at 118.
168. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Allows Charter’s Acquisition of
Time Warner Cable and Bright House Networks to Proceed with Conditions (Apr. 25, 2016);
Independent Measurement Expert Identified in Accordance with AT&T-DirectTV Merger
Condition, MB Docket No. 14-90, Public Notice, DA 15-1116, Oct. 1, 2015.
169. See infra Part VII.A.1.
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equal access to existing distribution channels.
3. Distributor to Distributor
The distributor-distributor market is becoming more concentrated and
less competitive as firm size increases to cover the capital costs of
specialized, high bandwidth pipes for video. Here, the question is, not so
much whether anti- competitive motivation will reduce competition, but
whether the exigencies of technological optimization will reduce it.
No distributor has the physical plant to connect everyone around the
globe that uses the Internet. The layered philosophy of the Internet
envisions many different physical pipes that connect to each other and
collectively connect everyone who puts content into and extracts content
from the Internet. Accordingly, any assessment of relevant markets must
consider the market for interconnecting distributors. They connect to each
other by peering and transit deals.
Historically, neither peering nor transit arrangements were subjected
to government regulation or to legal oversight, except for contract
enforcement, and merger conditions. High-volume backbone providers
had an incentive to interconnect. When they had roughly equivalent
traffic levels, exchanging traffic benefited both and the burdens on their
facilities were symmetrical. By engaging in peering instead of transit
exchanges, they spared themselves the accounting overhead associated
with charging for traffic.170 The market determines the various kinds of
peering and transit arrangements, the locations where they occur, and the
connectivity each provides, ranging from access to all connections that a
particular pier provides to access to only certain parts of the Internet.
Regulatory prescription of such arrangements is unwieldy and
impracticable without negating the desirable flexibility to accommodate
changing traffic patterns. No Internet engineer thinks that detailed
regulation appearing in transit arrangements is desirable.171
Moreover, the rapidly growing volume of video traffic necessitates
evolving the physical architecture of the Internet to handle it, suggesting
big specialized pipes from major points of origin, like TV broadcasters’
master control center in Atlanta,172 to high density markets, such as New
York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. It is more efficient to send NCIS
170. Mark Winther, White Paper: Tier 1 ISPs: What They Are and Why They Are Important,
IDC: ANALYZE THE FUTURE 11 (May 2006), https://www.us.ntt.net/downloads/papers/IDC_
Tier1_ISPs.pdf (arguing that distributor mergers and proliferation of large CDNs will
jeopardizing peering).
171. 2015 ONO note 482 (noting statement by FCC chairman that peering is a matter better
addressed separately from ONO).
172. Frank Beacham, Outsourced Master Control Drives NBC O&Os, TVNewsCheck, Nov.
17, 2011, http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/55504/outsourced-master-control-drives-nbc-oos
(describing contract with Encompass for master control operation in Atlanta).
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episodes through one link between an Atlanta router and one router close
to Chicago, rather than having all the packets for each viewer traverse
multiple routers throughout the Internet’s general mesh. A route
involving two or three hops is more efficient than one involving seven or
ten.173
If the specialized pipes were obligated to carry traffic unrelated to the
video programming that justified establishing them in the first place,
achievement of their purpose would be undermined. Nevertheless,
consolidation and its attendant vertical integration threaten the peering
phenomenon. The vertically integrated distributors have an unusually
strong position, vis-a-vis other distributors, because of their historic lastmile connectivity.174
They may disrupt the distributor-to-distributor market by degrading
the quality of peered connections, decline to peer with other distributors,
or impose higher transit or paid-peering charges.175 The FCC conditioned
its approval of the AT&T-SBC and Verizon-MCI mergers on their
maintaining the same number of peers, but only until 2008.176
4. Distributor to Viewer
The distributor-viewer market is becoming more competitive, though
still oligopolistic, with the addition of more broadband wireless coverage,
improvements in bi-directional satellite connectivity, and the promise of
ATSC 3.0. Competition in the distribution market also is increased by the
reality that broadband wireless providers have national footprints. At the
beginning of 2015, Verizon Wireless had a 38% market share, AT&T had
33%, Sprint had 14%, and T-Mobile had 13%.177
Here, the question is whether distributors will deploy artificial means
to limit competition in order to protect their traditional business models.
The distribution activity at the edge of the Internet presents the most
interesting questions about market structure. Here, competition is
facility-based, and the existing facilities require huge amounts of capital,
to build out an MVPD cable infrastructure or the last mile of wired
telephone access. The same thing is true of the cell phone infrastructure
and broadcast boomers. A small business is not likely to find capital to
allow it to compete directly with the distribution establishment for these
technologies, although it certainly could become a contractor to an
173. See 2015 ONO notes 487, 489 (noting evolution of peering system to include “on-netonly” agreements).
174. Winther, supra note 170, at 10-11.
175. Id. at 12 (listing anticompetitive temptations).
176. SBC Commc’ns, Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of
Control, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,290, 18,392 (2005).
177. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 165, at 15.
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established distributors.
The requirement by virtually all cable in MVPDs that subscribers use
interface hardware (“set-top box” or “cable box”) provided by the cable
company is a classic example of a tying arrangement. Moreover, the
programming of the cable boxes excludes programming originating from
anywhere but from the cable provider. This device requirement affects
only the market for traditional cable television; it does not affect the
market for cable Internet access. As television viewing moves from
traditional cable television connections to Internet TV, the
anticompetitive effect eventually will disappear.
Suppliers of interfaces offer viewers ways to get their cable streams
through bypassing the cable boxes, some hardware-based, and some
software based, but their market penetration is low.178 The
anticompetitive effect, however, is limited to that part of the market
served by cable MVPD’s. It has no effect on the part served by telephone
distributors and direct satellite distributors.
If this tie were to be broken, as the FCC proposes to do,179 competitors
of the cable companies would benefit only to the extent that viewers do
not cut the cable cord. Competitions would not have access to the cable
stream unless a subscriber subscribes to cable TV service.
The interesting alternative is the deployment of Wi-Fi, or pico- and
micro transceivers representing last mile alternatives to groups of
viewers. Anyone can buy a Wi-Fi point of presence for a few hundred
dollars and obtain a subscription to cable Internet, DSL Internet or
broadband Internet connectivity for another few hundred dollars per year.
The subscriptions are accompanied by the necessary cable modems, DSL
modems, and broadband wireless “dongles.” When the Internet access
provider permits, a subscriber can also obtain the necessary consumer
premises equipment at any number of online and brick-and-mortar
retailers.
Google Fiber is an important facilities-based new entrant into the
MVPD market. It has constructed fiber-to-the-premises systems in three
metropolitan areas and has started discussions in nine additional
metropolitan areas.180
With these low barriers to entry, new enterprises can supplement lastmile distribution. A condominium association, for example, likely
already has an array of Wi-Fi points of presence its facility, and it can
provide connectivity to the Super Bowl or Game of Thrones to everyone
178. Amazon Fire TV, AppleTV, Chromecast, Roku, FCC, In the Matter of Expanding
Consumers’ Video Navigation Choices, MB Docket No. 16-42, FCC 16-18 para. 14, at 9 (Feb 18,
2016) [hereinafter Cable Box NPRM] (nothing devices that can access OTT programming such
as Netflix, Amazon Instant Streaming, and Hulu, but for the most part not MVPD programming).
179. See infra Part VII.A.2.
180. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 165, at 31.
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in the condo complex, reducing the load on the distributors who connect
the complex to the rest of the Internet. One copy of the Super Bowl stream
is provided to the condo complex, and the last mile of distribution occurs
through the association’s Wi-Fi apparatus.
Already, major distributors recognize that sponsored Wi-Fi points of
presence represent an alternative to building out their infrastructures with
micro and picocells deployed by the distributors themselves. There are,
of course, a variety of capacity issues to be worked out– streaming the
Super Bowl to five hundred viewers in a condo complex requires much
more of the Wi-Fi system than a single-family household with several
television screens, PCs, and tablet computers connected wirelessly.
The capacity demand on the established distributors, however, may be
no greater than at present. If they send only one instance of the Super
Bowl to the condo complex, the traffic requirements on their edge
infrastructure is no greater then when they send it now to a single
subscriber.
To the extent that last mile distribution is performed by entities not
under the control of established distributors who pay for only a single
subscription, the scenario represents significant lost revenue to the
established providers. They will use copyright law’s treatment of
redistribution to the public or public performance to extract additional
fees. And, of course, they can set their own subscription terms and insist
on controlling the set-top boxes to enforce a requirement to pay more for
material that is redistributed to the condo members.
The market for last mile connectivity is oligopolistic. Only a handful
of sellers exist in each geographic market—cable modem, DSL, and
broadband wireless—while there are millions of buyers. In some
respects, competition among the three groups of sellers is ferocious, and
widespread deployment of ATSC 3.0 will add another competitor.
The risk is that each seller will try to restrict its customers from also
using competitor services by equipping their consumer premises
equipment with various kinds of lockout provisions for parallel streams.
A patchwork of FCC prohibitions addresses this interference with the
market, for example by prohibiting cable providers from restricting overthe-air reception,181 and, more recently, requiring cable providers to open
the set-top box market.
A countervailing trend exists in the distributor-to-viewer market that
is less friendly to competition: the shift away from generic browsers to
specialized apps, not only on exclusively mobile devices, but on new
operating systems for desktops and laptops, such as like Windows 10 and
Apple’s OS X Snow Leopard. Apps provide access to only one source of
content. If one already has the HBO Now app and wants to watch a movie
181. 47 C.F.R. § 1.4000
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from Netflix, one must download—and perhaps pay for—the Netflix app
as well. That imposes higher switching costs than if one simply types the
Netflix URL into a Google Chrome, Firefox, Microsoft Internet Explorer
or Safari browser.182 But on a computer and through a connection fast
enough to play video, the app download times are modest, as is the
pricing, so the switching costs are not all that high. If a user has free
access to the tens of thousands of apps that are widely available he still
has a high level of competitive choice.
5. Advertising
Anyone who wants to sell goods or services must communicate his
offerings to potential customers. Some form of advertising is the usual
way to do that. A seller may buy pages or parts of pages representing
display ads in print publications; they may distribute fliers; they may buy
time and attach their advertising to TV programs; they may make use of
the new technologies for targeted advertising to implant ads directly on
html pages served to viewers.
The market for connecting advertisers to advertising platforms is in a
considerable state of flux. Vertical integration of advertising sales teams
into content production and programming enterprises is substantial; most
television stations of any size have their own traffic departments and
advertising sales reps. In addition, long established advertising agencies
facilitate and reinforce connections between content providers and
programmers as customers for large enterprises with substantial
advertising budgets.
Significant economies of scale define the traditional market.
Transaction costs for advertisers are lower if they place a buy a few ads
with a handful of newspapers, television networks, and stations than if
they have to shop around the Web for everyone who might provide a
metaphorical billboard site. Moreover, the established relationships
increase the friction for an advertiser jumping ship and taking its revenue
elsewhere.
But targeted advertising is an undeniable reality, and its market
structure is completely different. The advertising agency function is
performed by ad networks and behavioral data base vendors, largely
independent of traditional advertising agencies. Moreover, the core
concept of targeted advertising spreads advertising budgets over millions
of very small “billboard sites” where ads are more likely reach audiences
with whom a particular ad resonates.
This part of the analysis focuses on the two markets that connect
182. See Brian Barrett, The FCC’s War to Liberate Your Cable Box, WIRED (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://www.wired.com/2016/02/fcc-set-top-box-rules/ (noting Google’s concern that move
toward apps diverts market share away from generic Internet access).
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advertisers with content producers and programmers. Targeted
advertising introduces a third advertising market, one that links
advertisers directly with distributors. A distributor knows who a viewer
is every time the viewer sends an http request for a page or a stream.
There is no reason that distributors cannot feed these individually
identifying attributes directly to ad networks, allowing them to respond
with targeted ads that the distributor integrates with the content stream
sent to individual viewers. The result bypasses content producers and
programmers.
Further, targeted advertising is available not only to established firms
like Procter & Gamble and General Motors; it is available to the smallest
e-commerce site. Anyone willing to host a virtual billboard can make a
deal through Google’s AdSense or with Facebook to host ads. It only
takes an Internet connection and a few minutes to set the terms online. So
the economies of scale are much reduced both for advertising hosts and
advertisers.
The establishment may prefer to stick with its established advertising
channels so that it can keep all the ad revenue rather than sharing it with
ad networks. It also may value its close ongoing relationships with
advertisers too much to turn them loose into a more diffuse advertising
market. But the trend toward more use of targeted advertising is
undeniable, and more and more advertising revenue will shift to these
new market mechanisms.
C. Non-Economic Switching Costs
Economic analysis long has identified transaction costs such as search
costs, information asymmetry, and collusion among producers as sources
of market failure.183 Too little attention, however, has been paid to
another source: non-economic switching costs, reflected in the power of
traditional relationships between buyers and sellers.184
The phenomenon has received some attention in a different area of
inquiry: relational contract, explaining why firms entering into
commercial contractual relations prefer to work things out rather than
suing each other for breach of contract.185 The ultimate relational contract
183. Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as Contractual
Integration: A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, And
Organization Theory, 32 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1015-18 (1983) (describing and giving examples of
opportunistic behavior that imposes transactions costs on market transactions).
184. Compare id. at 1017-18 (explaining how vertical integration can eliminate opportunism
as a transaction cost), with id. at 1030 (explaining how vertical integration imposes its own costs
such as self-interested employee or divisional behavior at odds with enterprise goals and
additional costs of making and enforcing rules to mitigate effects of such behavior).
185. “Relational contracting systems are designed to maintain very long-term relationships
that will undoubtedly be faced with considerable pressures for change as they are subjected to
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arrangement is vertical integration.186
Economic evaluation of alternatives is surely part of every make or
buy decision. Contracts with outside suppliers almost always have
limited terms, and when the terms expire the parties renegotiate,
influenced by what they perceive as competing sources of supply. That is
the main difference between a vertically integrated enterprise and one
purchasing collateral functions in the marketplace. The relationship
between a corporate subsidiary and its parent corporation does not get
renegotiated periodically in the same sense. Changes in management and
business failures may stimulate a reassessment of how decision-making
authority is allocated between subsidiary and parent, and sometimes the
participants in an integrated enterprise get divorced, as when the
corporate entity is dissolved or a subsidiary sold.
In theory, rational, hardheaded, economic analysis of alternative
competitive alternatives is a regular part of supplier purchaser contracting
in markets. But the switching costs often are enormous and unpredictable.
If, say, a television station decides to change its news helicopter
contractor, it must engage in an extensive due diligence investigation to
see if the new contractor can do the job, to scrutinize price and cost
figures from both entities to ensure that they are comparable, to consider
whether the new helicopter personnel will have good relationships with
assignment editors and transmission control personnel, and whether the
new provider has as good back up capability as the old if the helicopter
breaks or a pilot is sick.
Centralized master control functions for television programmers
provide an even more dramatic example. ABC contracts with Imagine
Communications to provide centralized master control from Atlanta for
all their owned-and-operated owned stations.187 For this to work—as it
does—thousands of detailed interfaces, human and technological, are
necessary between network and contractor, contractor and station
infrastructure, and network, contractor, station workflow. If a station or
network decides to change master-control contractors, untangling all of
this would be a massive undertaking.
Circuit Judge Easterbrook made the point in a case involving a
trademark dispute:
Allowing the businesses to part ways is especially important in
exogenous economic shocks.” Id. at 1039 (explaining relational contract theory and how longterm relationships reduce adaptation to changes in business environment).
186. Id. at 1043-44.
187. Phil Kurz, ABC To Move To Cloud-Based Master Control, TVNewsCheck (Apr. 12,
2015), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/84472/abc-to-move-to-cloudbased-master-control
(reporting Disney’s ABC contracting with Imagine Communications for centralized master
control of its televisions broadcasting).
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distribution contracts and other forms of partial vertical
integration, where the firms must coordinate their conduct over an
extended period to deliver a product. Terminability means that, if
the firms' goals or methods diverge, either side may get out. It also
means that both sides have a credible threat to walk away, and this
threat may induce the other side to compromise. Because these
long-term relations produce continuing profits for both sides, both
have something to lose by taking the exit option without trying to
work out differences first. A combination of the need for flexibility
in relational contracts and the fact that both sides have an ongoing
interest in accommodating the other makes a presumption of
terminability sensible.
This trademark license differs from a distribution contract. These
parties are not locked together in a form of partial integration by
contract-as, for example, when a distribution partner serves as a
substitute for vertical integration into warehousing and sales.188
Human caution shapes the development of any market. An
economist’s model of the “rational man” may suggest certain scenarios
for market evolution, but the decisions are going to be made not by
robotic “rational men,” but by human beings with limitations on their
creative vision, reluctance to take risks that may sideline their careers,
concerned about cannibalizing existing revenue streams and therefore
failing to meet budget and investor expectations, and simply daunted by
the reality that most new ideas do not work out. A high proportion of first
movers regret having made the first move.
So notwithstanding the facts that compelling content is available from
indie producers, that stringers can handle more news collection, that
drones can replace news helicopters in many instances, and that Internet
only TV, whether through a ATSC 3.0 or IPTV, might be more efficient
and appeal to viewers more, the established enterprises are less likely to
be first movers than new entrants.
Not all new entrants are tiny. Google and Amazon have market
capitalization exceeding that of the largest of the integrated media
companies. The market configurations sketched in this Article may or
may not be realized, but if they are not, the reason will not be the
reluctance of the establishment to embrace them, alone. Google and
Amazon will be happy to take the first step.
188. Baldwin Piano, Inc. v. Deutsche Wurlitzer GmbH, 392 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2004)
(citing Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992); Charles
J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981);
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents & the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
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VII. PUBLIC POLICY
The Internet, unlike earlier forms of information dissemination, has
never been tightly regulated. Cable, television, direct broadcast satellite
and telephone dissemination have grown up with the FCC alongside, and
often prodding providers in the ribs. Efforts to force natural or de jure
monopolies to open their architectures to competition has been a
consistent theme in communications regulation. Common carriage by
telephone systems is an early example. The Carterphone and MCI
decisions and the breakup of AT&T came next, and then the ongoing
struggle under the Act to force incumbent local service carriers to open
their networks to CLECs, and the effort to re-level the playing field for
television broadcasters and cable and direct satellite distributors as new
technologies and business practices tilted it one way or another.
Now, the gravitational pull of the Internet architecture for video is
reopening the question of how much and how the Internet should be
regulated. New technologies are opening some parts of Internet television
to more competition, even as other technologies make it more
concentrated and less competitive. In the areas where competition is
intensifying, anti-competitive temptations grow how long with it.
The disruptive technologies have shifted the justification for
regulation of communication networks. The technologies of frequency
sharing have lessened need for exclusive FCC licenses to particular
frequencies and made spectrum use more efficient when the FCC grants
block of frequencies to multiple users and the makes other blocks
available for unlicensed use. The fact that the Internet evolved into a form
of common carriage without any of its components being regulated as
common carriers has fueled one side of the debate over new neutrality.
But the rise of CDNs as private networks specializing in applications, like
television, that demand very high bandwidth has skewed the Internet
architecture and fuels the other side of the debate. Private networks do
not hold themselves up as common carriers; instead, they make private
deals with those who can help them find their capital investments.
The need for, and utility of, some regulatory tools has diminished.
Must carry is an artifact of a distribution market in which over-the-air
television was suffering inroads from other means of delivery—mostly
cable. That shift is almost complete now, and for the time being at least,
the perception that viewers want local content means that distributors
want to carry local television programs; the law does not have to force
them to carry it.
Compulsory licensing under the retransmission consent rules189 was a
189. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 122 (2017). See generally Patrick Murphy, Retransmission Consent:
A Mixed Signal for Cable Copyright, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 237 (1993) (evaluating
retransmission consent); Gregory J. Vogt, Does Retransmission Consent Need Fixing? (Or Do
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compromise born out of the fact that television programming was an
intangible good that was non-rival and non-excludable—the traditional
hallmarks for copyright protection to avoid free riding.190 Yet, for
practical reasons, over-the-air content had never been subjected to
copyright protection. Retransmission consent was a practical
compromise to extend copyright protection for broadcasters while
preserving the cable industry’s established access. Now, digital
distribution via cable and wireless makes television programing
excludable. The law does not need to protect it; copyright owners can
embed copy protection with the content.
The concept of broad compulsory licensing could be extended to
harmonize copyright protection with net neutrality, but the political
constellation would have little stomach for this, and the proliferation of
new sources of content suggests that any need for it is fading rather than
intensifying. Content regulation in the form of obligations to carry publicservice programming now seems quaint, after the Supreme Court held
that such obligations violate the First Amendment except for entities
holding exclusive broadcast licenses.191 The FCC generally has backed
away from it. The battleground mainly involves net neutrality and
opening set-top boxes.
A. FCC Regulation
The anticompetitive incentives and resulting anticompetitive behavior
has led the FCC to issue rules to protect competition, including the net
neutrality rule. FCC rules under section 628(c)(2) of the Act prohibit
cable operators from inducing vendors to shut out competing MVPDs,
but only with respect to satellite delivered programming.192 Since 2010,
similar rules apply to terrestrial delivered cable affiliated programming
under section 628(b).193 FCC rules prohibit cable operators or other
MVPDs from obtaining exclusive rights to programming as a condition
for carriage.194

Consumers Need Help So They Can Watch the Super Bowl, World Series, And Academy
Awards?), 22 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 108 (2014) (arguing that entry of new competitors to cable
distributors have given broadcasters leverage to demand higher retransmission consent fees).
190. See John A. Rothchild, The Social Costs of Technological Protection Measures, 34
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1181, 1184 (2007) (explaining character of authorship as a “public good”).
191. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (explaining that
rationale for relaxing First Amendment protection of broadcasters does not apply to cable
distributors).
192. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 165, at 19.
193. Id. at 20.
194. Id.
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1. Net Neutrality
The Open Network Order, and all other proposals for net neutrality,
are essentially non-discrimination rules. Cell phone providers are
common carriers, and thus may not discriminate.195 Non-discrimination
rules in any market are simple in concept but over time prove difficult to
implement and enforce. The reality is that, for markets to function freely,
buyers and sellers need to make choices. Most choices must be dictated
by variables that each participant sets in terms of his or her own
preference functions. Thousands of employment discrimination cases
show how difficult it can be to decide whether a decision is impermissibly
discriminatory or is based on rational workplace considerations.
Likewise, a century of enforcement of non-discrimination rules in
railroad economic regulation shows how wide the opportunities are for
game playing and evasion and how vigorous enforcement of nondiscrimination can strangle innovation as new technologies become
available.196
After its first open Internet order was nullified in part by the DC circuit
in Verizon197 it promulgated its 2015 Open Internet Order.198 Evidence
of discrimination by Comcast against Netflix was one of the major
motivations for the Open Internet Order.199 The order classifies both fixed
and mobile broadband Internet access service as a telecommunication
service under title II.
The pipe providers argued that net neutrality was poor public policy.
Part of their argument was that plenty of competition exists in the market,
broadly defined—cable Internet providers face competition from
broadband wireless and DSL.
They also argued that meeting consumer demand for high-quality
video requires substantial investment in the cable infrastructure, and
cable firms should be able to charge a premium for access to the faster,
high-quality infrastructure. Smaller content providers countered that a
premium to Comcast is a surtax on them, worsening their business model.
If they do not pay it, the relatively poorer quality of their viewers’
experiences will drive viewers to their competitors who do pay for
premium access.
The ONO addresses the market connecting programmers and
distributors. It refers to programmers as “edge providers” and the
195. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(1) (2017).
196. Central Power & Light Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 137, 144-80 (5th Cir. 1980).
197. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 648.
198. Protecting and Promoting the open Internet, GN Docket no. 14-28, FCC 15-24 (2015)
[hereinafter ONO].
199. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 165, at
122-23.
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distributors as “backbone providers.” The report identifies the factors that
impair competition in the market: concentrated market structure,
significant barriers to entry by new distributors, switching costs, and
incentives for distributors to discriminate against certain programmers—
those affiliated with a distributor in integrated enterprises, premium
payments by programmers for favored treatment, and programmerdemanded blocking of competing programmers to protect programmers
from competition in their markets.
The 2015 Open Network Order generally imitates the 2010 order, but
asserts authority under Title II as well as section 706 for it. The Order
prohibits blocking: “A person engaged in the provision of broadband
Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not
block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices,
subject to reasonable network management.”200
Providers may, however, block illegal content, including infringing
material.201 It prohibits throttling:
“A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not impair or degrade
lawful Internet traffic based on Internet content, application, or service,
or use of a non-harmful device, subject to reasonable network
management.”202
It prohibits paid prioritization:
A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not engage in
paid prioritization.
“Paid prioritization” refers to the management of a broadband
provider’s network to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over
other traffic, including through use of techniques such as traffic
shaping, prioritization, resource reservation, or other forms of
preferential traffic management, either (a) in exchange for
consideration (monetary or otherwise) from a third party, or (b) to
benefit an affiliated entity.203
Finally, it prohibits imposing any unreasonable disadvantage:
Any person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not
unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably disadvantage (i) end
200.
201.
202.
203.

ONO, supra note 198, at 48.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 53.
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users’ ability to select, access, and use broadband Internet access
service or the lawful Internet content, applications, services, or
devices of their choice, or (ii) edge providers’ ability to make
lawful content, applications, services, or devices available to end
users. Reasonable network management shall not be considered a
violation of this rule.204
It declined, however, to require that practices be “commercially
reasonable.”205
The Commission recognized that programmers with significant
resources still can gain an advantage “by constructing their own extensive
networks that interconnect directly with the ISPs.”206 The rule applies
both to fixed and mobile broadband.207
The Court of Appeals overturned the 2010 order because the FCC had
not justified its provisions under relevant statutory authority.208
The principal thrust of the 2015 ONO is, not so much to change the
content of the net neutrality requirements, as to justify them based on the
FCC’s authority to regulate common carriers under title II as well as its
authority, which was the core of the 2010 order, to encourage the
department of new technologies, under section 706.209 The commission
justified its conclusion that backbone Internet connectivity is the 21stcentury of common carriage by telephone in the 1930s,210 but also it also
acknowledged the undesirability of 1930s-style detailed regulation of
market entry and exit, rate and service regulation.211 Its solution was to
subject backbone Internet providers to Title II common-carrier regulation
but to exercise its “forbearance” authority,212 to exempt them from most
of the detailed rules historically applied to telephone companies.213
Two significant changes in FCC posture are important pillars of the
2015 ONO. First, the agency changed its position that Internet
connectivity constituted not, telecommunications, subject which
204. Id. at 60.
205. Id. at 65.
206. Id. at 57 (declining to act to limit such a practice).
207. Id. at 50.
208. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 652-653 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that FCC
failed to cite any statutory authority for imposing net neutrality provisions); Verizon v. FCC, 740
F.3d 623, 628, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding FCC open network order invalid because it classified
broadband providers as not being common carriers, yet regulated them as such, contravening
statute).
209. 740 F.3d at 628 (holding that FCC reasonably interpreted section 706 to authorize open
network order).
210. ONO, supra note 198, at 315 (drawing analogy to 1930s monopoly regulation).
211. Id. para. 451 (forbearing to impose rate regulation).
212. Id. para. 435 (discussing forbearance authority).
213. Id. para. 451 (discussing forbearance to impose rate regulation).
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regulation, but “information services.” The original classification was
counterintuitive, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his famous pizzadelivery analogy.214 In the 2015 order, the FCC squarely reiterates its new
position that Internet connectivity is a telecommunication service, and
that it can be separated from content production and programming when
the same enterprises perform multiple functions.215
A second major change in position involves whether the same net
neutrality rules should apply to broadband wireless carriers as to fixed
broadband carriers. In its 2010 order, the FCC said, “no.”216 The 2015
order erases this distinction, pointing out that broadband wireless is no
longer a nascent industry, beset with uncertainties about how it should be
deployed, what technology it should use, and consumer response. Those
were the differences between mobile and fixed broadband justified lighter
treatment of mobile broadband in 2010, but it they no longer do.217
Application of the 2015 ONO will prove challenging because of the
diversity of arrangements through which various kinds of traffic
discrimination can occur, much of it justifiable based on basic design
considerations and business arrangements.218
The 2015 ONO does not distinguish among different types of Internet
exchange points in imposing its open-access duties.219
It seems obvious that, if AT&T or Comcast programs their set top box
or edge routers connecting a neighborhood of viewers to their systems to
block packets originating with Netflix that would violate the order.
Similarly, if Comcast refuses to allow transit or peering access to the
Netflix distribution network upstream at one of its exchange points that
also would violate the order.
But what if ABC builds a large pipe from its master control center in
Atlanta to Chicago, to carry video programming to its viewers there?220
Fox demands upstream access to the new pipe under the 2015 ONO. If
ABC must give Fox access, it is being forced to share the fruits of an
investment it has made alone. This is precisely the problem the
confronted legislators and the FCC and telephone providers when the
214. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Assn. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S 967, 1007 (2005)
(Scalia, dissenting) (arguing that the FCC should not treat the telecommunication service separate
from the content in which subscribers access, and comparing it to a pizzeria’s combined services
of baking and delivering pizza, which are not two separate elements of the pizza business).
215. ONO, supra note 198, para. 310 (discussing history of broadband regulation).
216. Id. para. 341 (describing changed rationale for regulation of wireless services).
217. Id. paras. 306-425 (discussing evolution of regulation of wireless services).
218. See id. at 88(explaining how incentives to offer open access changes with shifts
between peering and transit arrangements).
219. See id. at 57 (noting Netflix comments express concern about discrimination by
Comcast at peering points).
220. Actually it probably would lease additional fiber capacity rather than digging a trench
from Atlanta to Chicago and laying new fiber.
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1996 Act was adopted. To what extent should a facilities-based carrier be
forced to share its facilities with a competitor who skips the facilities
investment?221 The general answer in the telephone context was
distinguish between existing facilities, as to which the capital was already
sunk, and new facilities.222 Facility-based incumbents had to share
existing facilities, but not the new ones.223 A consensus exists, however,
that telephone style regulation should not be imposed on the Internet, not
even a “simplified” regulation of the ILECs under the 1996 Act, circa
2000.
Commissioner Ajit Pai articulated the concern in his dissent to the
2015 ONO.224 In particular, he criticized the extension of regulation to
internet traffic exchange at the wholesale level:
But the Order then goes quite a bit further and adopts a “regulatory
backstop prohibiting common carriers from engaging in unjust and
unreasonable practices,” subjecting Internet traffic exchange
arrangements like those mentioned immediately above to “sections
201 and 202 on a case-by-case basis.” With this authority, the
Commission can order an Internet service provider “to establish
physical connections with other carriers, to establish through
routes and charges applicable thereto . . . , and to establish and
provide facilities and regulations for operating such through
routes.” In other words, the Order classifies Internet traffic
exchange as a Title II telecommunications service in everything
but name.225
He extended Justice Scalia’s pizzeria metaphor: “[T]his Order does
not only cover the delivery of a baked pie. Instead, the Order reaches the
exchange of ingredients between a pizzeria and its suppliers, since all
those ingredients must be ‘delivered’ to the pizzeria.”226 AT&T
emphasized this possibility in opposing a Title II basis for net
neutrality.227
221. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW §§ 7.03[D], [E], [F] (rev. ed.
2010) (explaining economic rationale for FCC’s imposing unbundling, resale, and interconnection
obligations on monopoly telephone companies).
222. Id. at 7-31 to 7-32 (explaining different economic incentives with respect to existing
facilities, compared with new facilities).
223. Id.
224. ONO, supra note 198, at 321.
225. Id. at 347 (Pai, disssenting) (internal footnotes omitted).
226. Id. at 360
227.
It would capture movies purchased from Google Play or iTunes, videos
downloaded from YouTube, and OTT subscription services like Netflix and
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The answer lies in the 2015 ONO’s was embrace of the common
carrier concept and the order’s distinction between private networks and
common carriage. The ONO does not impose open access obligations on
private networks.228 In the example, the new pipe from ABC's Atlanta
master control service center to Chicago is a private network to which it
can control access as it wants.229
On the other hand, a backbone provider clearly engages in common
carriage within the meaning of the Act, because it holds itself out as
willing to handle traffic from anyone. So does Comcast with respect to
its Internet access subscribers at the retail level.
Commissioner O’Reilly, who criticizes extension of open network
obligations to internet traffic exchange, explained the distinction:
[C]ontent providers and network operators enter into
interconnection relationships with ISPs through individually
negotiated private agreements. Regardless of the form they take—
“peering,” “transit,” or “on-net-only”—providers do not hold
themselves out to serve the public indifferently. When considering
whether to enter into these “voluntary, market-based agreements,”
providers “independently make decisions about interconnection by
weighing the benefits and costs on a case-by-case basis.” As one
provider stated, “the exchange of Internet traffic invariably entails
arrangements between sophisticated commercial parties with very
large amounts of traffic so.” Indeed, another provider noted that
providers reserve the right not to enter into agreements even where
guidelines are met. This “flexibility to customize service
arrangements for a particular customer is the hallmark of private
carriage, which is the antithesis of common carriage.” As such,
these arrangements, which some mistakenly refer to as
“interconnection,” have never been regulated as common carriage

HBO Go. It could also implicate advertising served over the Internet — if those
companies are providing, at least in part, a Title II transmission service,
contribution to USF is mandatory for the revenue associated with the Title II
service. That means allocating revenues between the telecommunications service
and the information service, filings justifying those allocations, Form 499s. . . .
you get the drift. Innovators would be paralyzed before they even get off the
ground. . . . Title II regulation would strangle broadband investment.
Jim Cicconi, Net Neutrality and Modern Memory, AT&T PUBLIC POLICY BLOG (June 6, 2014),
http://www.attpublicpolicy.com/fcc/net-neutrality-and-modern-memory/.
228. ONO, supra note 198, at 149.
229. See Cicconi, supra note 227 (arguing that common carrier regulation always has
allowed higher prices for higher levels of service).
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services subject to Title II.230
Despite the concerns, the Order itself is cautious about extending open
access obligations to peering: “we conclude that, at this time, application
of the no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard and the
prohibitions on blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization to the Internet
traffic exchange arrangements is not warranted.”231
Since broadband Internet access service providers cannot, on their
own, connect to every end point on the Internet in order to provide
full Internet access to their customers, they historically paid thirdparty backbone service providers for transit. Backbone service
providers interconnected upstream until traffic reached Tier 1
backbone service providers, which peered with each other and
thereby provided their customer networks with access to the full
Internet.487 In this hierarchical arrangement of networks,
broadband Internet access providers negotiated with backbone
service providers; broadband Internet access providers generally
did not negotiate with edge providers to gain access to content.232
The extension of Tier 1 backbones tied together at a smaller number
of peering points reduces incentives for settlement-free peering with
smaller distributors.233
Internet traffic exchange agreements have historically been and
will continue to be commercially negotiated. We do not believe
that it is appropriate or necessary to subject arrangements for
Internet traffic exchange (which are subsumed within broadband
Internet access service) to the rules we adopt today. We conclude
that it would be premature to adopt prescriptive rules to address
any problems that have arisen or may arise. It is also premature to
draw policy conclusions concerning new paid Internet traffic
exchange arrangements between broadband Internet access service
providers and edge providers, CDNs, or backbone services.234
It is not, however, embrace a completely laissez-faire approach to
peering:

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

ONO, supra note 198, at 392-93 (O'Reilly, dissenting).
Id. at 87.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 92 (internal footnotes omitted).
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[W]e believe that a case-by-case approach is appropriate regarding
Internet traffic exchange arrangements between broadband
Internet access service providers and edge providers or
intermediaries—an area that historically has functioned without
significant Commission oversight. . . . [W]e will rely on the
regulatory backstop prohibiting common carriers from engaging in
unjust and unreasonable practices. . . . The Commission’s
regulatory and enforcement oversight, including over common
carriers, is complementary to vigorous antitrust enforcement. . . .
[I]t will remain essential for the Commission, as well as the
Department of Justice, to continue to carefully monitor, review,
and where appropriate, take action against any anti-competitive
mergers, acquisitions, agreements or conduct, including where
broadband Internet access services are concerned.235
Industry structure figures into the calculation. A natural monopoly or
any other kind of monopolist might have an incentive to claim that it is a
private network, to avoid its obligations under the ONO. But the history
of common carriage provides a conceptual solution for this. Owners of
“essential facilities” are deemed to be common carriers,236 at least if there
is any kind of holding out.
An interesting question is whether TV stations embracing ATSC 3.0
and turning their boomers into Internet access points thereby become
common carriers subject to ONO obligations. The answer is, “no,” unless
they hold themselves out to carry traffic from anyone. If they wish to
carry only their own programming on their facilities, they qualify as
private networks, thus exempt from the ONO. Status as a private carrier
does not exclude the possibility of a few select contractual arrangements
to carry other people’s traffic. The distinction between holding out to the
public in general and being a private contract carrier is fairly well worked
out in the context of aviation regulations.237 Whatever the merits of the
arguments for and against the Open Network Order, litigation is
certain.238

235. Id. at 93
236. See MCI Comm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1144 (7th Cir. 1983)
(discussing relationship between common carrier status and essential facilities doctrine).
237. FAA, AC 120-12A – Private Carriage Versus Common Carriage of Persons or Property
(Apr. 24, 1986), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC%2012012A.pdf (explaining the difference).
238. See Larry Downes, On Net Neutrality, Six Ways the FCC’s Public Utility Order Will
Lose in Court, FORBES, (Apr. 8, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2015/
04/08/on-net-neutrality-six-ways-the-fccs-public-utility-order-will-lose-in-court/#b0a89e5303b2
(marshalling policy and legal arguments against subjecting Internet access to Title II).
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2. Set-Top Boxes
FCC regulation comes into play here with respect to any requirements
for set-top boxes. Also, judicial interpretation of distribution public
performance rights is important for the same reason.
On February 16, 2016, the FCC released a notice of proposed
rulemaking that would require cable MVPDs to adopt open architecture
for cable interfaces and prohibit them from requiring rental of their own
set-top boxes as a condition of cable subscription.239 The proposal applies
not just to cable MVPDs but to all MVPDs, including telephone
companies and direct satellite providers.240
The Commission and the Congress vigorously debated the merits of
the proposal. Everyone agrees that, in the long run hardware interfaces
will be unnecessary. They disagree, however, on the need for FCC action
to facilitate this transition. Chairman Wheeler241 and Commissioners
Clyburn242 and Rosenworcel243 support the proposed rule and advocate
its adoption mainly in terms of the monopoly rents that the current set top
box requirements extract from subscribers. They also argue that it will
open the market for programmers. “[C]reators of content who have been
unable to get MVPD carriage may soon have a means to reach consumers
directly.”244 Opening the architecture will make it easier for OTT
programmers to compete with MVPD distributors’ exclusive deals with
programmers.245
Commissioners Pai246 and O’Reilly247 attack it on seven grounds.
First, they argue that it is unnecessary. The market is already transitioning
away from the need for proprietary interface hardware.
Second, they argue that it will have the effect of arresting or delaying
239. Cable Box NPRM, supra note 178.
240. Id. at 50.
241. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER,
available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-18A2.pdf.
242. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MIGNON L.
CLYBURN, available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-18A3.pdf
[hereinafter CABLE BOX CLYBURN STATEMENT].
243. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JESSICA
ROSENWORCEL, available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-18A4.pdf.
244. CABLE BOX CLYBURN STATEMENT, supra note 242.
245. Brian Barrett, The FCC’s War to Liberate Your Cable Box, WIRED, (Feb. 19, 2016,
5:46 AM), http://www.wired.com/2016/02/fcc-set-top-box-rules/ (noting argument that opening
up cable box architectures allows viewers to get Netflix and all other OTT services, lessening
demand for cable subscriptions).
246. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER
AJIT PAI, available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-18A5.pdf.
247. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER
MICHAEL O’RIELLY, available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-1618A6.pdf.
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technological development otherwise certain to lead to improved, more
open, interfaces. Third, they argue, somewhat inconsistently, that the
proposal will jeopardize the exclusive deals internalized into the cable
programming stream and thereby undercut established business models.
If the subscriber cable interface is open, any competing distributor can
alter the stream provided by the cable distributors, in effect getting a free
ride, they say, on the cable operator’s programming. In many cases, the
competitors will alter the programming to provide their own, differing,
programming products.248 Their competitive focus is on the market
between programmers and distributors, not on the horizontal market in
which distributors compete.
Fourth, as a part of the third line of attack, the critics explicitly cite
the possibility that competitors will take advantage of open interface
architecture to substitute their own ads for those embedded in the stream
provided by the cable companies, thereby reducing the revenue
advertisers are willing to pay the cable distributors.249 Fifth, the critics
recognize the growing value of data about viewer behavior.250 They argue
that the present set-top box arrangements enable cable distributors to
acquire and monetize those data, and that competitor access it will further
undermine cable distributor business models, going forward.
Sixth, they argue that open interface architectures will expose viewers
to breaches of their security and to more general forms of piracy and
computer crime. It is not clear, however, how the proposal would serve
its intended goal unless it requires that the cable companies provide the
keys to decrypt their program content; virtually all television content
distributed by cable MVPDs is encrypted. Merely opening up access to
the encrypted scheme does not enable competitors to do much with it.251
Some commentators argue that the proposal is merely a move in a
“game of special-interest squabbles that use the regulator to get a leg up,”
intended to benefit information brokers at the expense of cable
distributors.252 The cable industry fiercely opposes it. “Rather than
investing in their own programming or negotiating with other content
248. The proposal, however, obligates competing interface providers to “implement content
protection to ensure that the security of MVPD services is not jeopardized, and must respect
licensing terms regarding copyright, entitlement, and robustness.” Cable Box NPRM, supra note
178, at 17.
249. See Brian Barrett, The FCC’s War to Liberate Your Cable Box, WIRED, (Feb. 19, 2016,
5:46 AM), http://www.wired.com/2016/02/fcc-set-top-box-rules/ (noting claim by cable industry
that effect of proposal is to allow Google to insert ads into cable programming).
250. Cable Box NPRM, supra note 178, at 9 (soliciting comment on degree to which
MVPDs track consumer viewing behavior and profit exploiting the data or selling it).
251. Id. ¶¶ 51-60, at 26-29 (discussing and imposing requirements to protecting digital rights
management schemes).
252. George S. Ford, The FCC’s cynical set-top policy, THE HILL, (Feb. 3, 2016, 7:30AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/268004-the-fccs-cynical-set-top-box-play.
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creators, Big Tech companies want the FCC to allow them to “poach”
video programming without honoring agreements or paying licensing
fees. Critics call it a “a brazen money grab.” Small, diverse and
independent programmers would be particularly at risk.253
B. Copyright is the Major Barrier Now
Copyright remains an important part of the regulatory equation
because it makes it so easy for content producers to insist on tying
arrangement. Broad net neutrality is not going to work unless the
monopoly power associated with copyright is addressed. The FCC could
extend compulsory licensing or the courts could expand the copyright
misuse doctrine.254
The problem is not copyright; it is exclusive dealing. While movie
studios and record labels exaggerate the effect, piracy does occur, and,
has some adverse effect on revenue streams for those who have invested
in creating content. Eliminating copyright would decrease content
production.
The existing copyright act has the seeds of one possible solution: the
mechanical license for audio recordings, and the retransmission consent
rule. The so-called mechanical license refers to the compulsory license
mandated by section 115,255 which requires the owner of a copyrighted
audio recording who releases it for distribution to one distributor to make
it available to all distributors. The mandate is accompanied by a statutory

253. The Future of TV Coalition, http://futureoftv.com/#sthash. 6T9n1Cf0.dpuf
254. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Lindor, 531 F. Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D. N.Y. 2007)
(observing that most instances of copyright misuse arise from typing arrangements or other
activity that violate antitrust law; striking misuse defense in infringement action); Sandy Azer, A
Three-Tiered Public Policy Approach to Copyright Misuse in the Context Of Tying Arrangements,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (2013).
This Note proposes a three-tiered framework, as follows. First, the court must
determine whether the tying arrangement is outside the scope and boundaries of
the copyright grant. If it is, the copyright misuse defense prevails. If it is not, the
court must next inquire about the availability of feasible economic alternatives
for the defendant. If there are, the defense fails. If such alternatives do not exist,
the court must last examine whether the copyright owner has any critical business
justifications for the tying arrangement. If so, the defense fails; if not, the defense
prevails. The alleged infringer carries the burden of proof for the first two
inquiries and the copyright owner carries the burden for the final inquiry. The
following subsections describe the framework of the proposed approach in
greater detail.
Id. at 121.
255. 17 U.S.C. § 115.
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scheme for determining royalties. Sections 111256 and 122257 grant
statutory licenses to cable and direct-satellite distributors to rebroadcast
over the air television programs.
Government-set prices are in disfavor, for good reason. They divert
resources into litigating over rates from productive activity; rates are set
according to political power rather than market forces; rates tend to
become more complex over time to try to stay a step ahead of evasive
efforts; and rate regulation undermine innovation in products and
contractual arrangement. These are the lessons learned from decades of
railroad and airline rate regulation, which was abandoned as a result.
But a compulsory license need not be accompanied by government
rate regulation. The retransmission right for cable TV enterprises carrying
local TV station programming is an example. The congress could craft a
21st-century equivalent of mechanical rights that would allow the market
to set prices. One straightforward for doing this is to enact a mostfavored-nation clause as a part of the arrangement; actually, it would be
more logical to call it a broader must-carry rule. Whatever rate one pipe
negotiates with content provider must be offered by that content provider
to everyone else. There is a long history of nondiscriminatory pricing
rules in traditional communications and transportation regulation.
To be sure, those traditional regulatory approaches been abandoned in
favor of greater reliance on market, but the major players in the
communications industry have never been cheerleaders for competitive
markets. Throughout their history, they have jockeyed continuously for
government intervention to favor their economic position at the expense
of their competitors, suppliers, and customers. That jockeying will
continue as technology advances, and there is no reason that it should not
be channeled by an understanding of what advances social welfare.
C. Relying on the Market
Broadly accepted law-and-economics theory says government
intervention is legitimate when it corrects for market failure, the realities
of such intervention are fraught with difficulties. Intervenors must guess
how technology will develop and reshape markets. Statutes and
regulations are hard to change once they are on the books. Interest group
politics skews the content of the intervention so it often adds to market
failure instead of reducing it. Moreover, detailed government
intervention, especially that focused on setting rates, distracts market
participants from their core business activities and invites them to divert
energies from innovation and marketing to litigation and politics.
256. 17 U.S.C. § 111.
257. 17 U.S.C. § 122.

2017]

KEEPING THE INTERNET INVISIBLE: TELEVISION TAKES OVER

193

The market structure for video entertainment is highly concentrated,
but the disruptive technologies are undermining the competitive
dominance of legacy firms. Moreover, the conflicting interests among
producers, programmers, and distributors are sufficiently great that
competition is actually quite robust. In the vertical dimension, large firms
adjacent to each other wage brutal battles as they negotiate new terms.
Negotiations between cable companies and television and sports
networks are a strong example.258
In the horizontal dimension, broadband wireless providers, DSL
providers, and cable Internet providers fight ferociously for market share,
and now ATSC 3.0 equips TV stations to do the same with broadband
wireless providers. Programmers want to attach their ads to their
programming so they not cannot be stripped off and discarded by viewers
or stripped off and replaced by others in the chain. In this respect,
programmers have a mixed view of targeted advertising. If they can
control ad placement and get the benefits of targeting technology, their
position to obtain advertising revenue is enhanced. On the other hand, if
someone else further down the chain controls ad placement, the
programmers lose control of their advertising and likely a share of
advertising revenue.
One of the advantages of targeted advertising is that it relieves the ad
platform of the cost of soliciting advertisers. TV stations already have the
marketing infrastructure necessary to solicit advertisers, and so in that
respect, a shift for targeted advertising does not benefit them as much as
of benefits their new entrant competitors. New entrant competitors
experience targeted advertising as a reduction in the economic barriers to
entry.
If television stations regain control of the distribution of their
programming, prying viewers away from cable, DSL, and broadband
wireless providers, they secure their control of advertising, whether it is
of the traditional kind or targeted.
FCC Commissioner Ajit Pai, dissenting from the 2015 Open Internet
Order,259 explained some of the pernicious effects of aggressive
government regulation:
[T]he FCC is abandoning a twenty-year-old, bipartisan framework
for keeping the Internet free and open in favor of Great
Depression-era legislation designed to regulate Ma Bell, at least
the American public is getting something in return, right? Wrong.
258. See Richard Sandomir et al., To Protect Its Empire, ESPN Stays on Offense, N.Y.
TIMES, (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/sports/ncaafootball/to-defend-itsempire-espn-stays-on-offensive.html?pagewanted=all (reporting $ 6 billion in cable fees to
ESPN, which televises 35,000 hours of sports programming annually).
259. ONO, supra note 198, at 321.
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The Internet is not broken. There is no problem for the government
to solve.260
The FCC’s newfound control extends to the design of the Internet
itself, from the last mile through the backbone. Section 201(a) of
the Communications Act gives the FCC authority to order
“physical connections” and “through routes,” meaning the FCC
can decide where the Internet should be built and how it should be
interconnected. And with the broad Internet conduct standard,
decisions about network architecture and design will no longer be
in the hands of engineers but bureaucrats and lawyers.261
D. Keeping the Internet Invisible
At each level of television production, programming, and distribution
competition is potentially intensifying with the advent of new entrants.
Stringers compete with salaried reporters and photographers for the news
collection part of content production. Indie movie makers compete with
established studios for entertainment content production.
In the programming layer, large new entrants like Amazon, Google,
and Netflix are seeking new content producers and have the wherewithal
to force their programming through existing or new distribution pipes.
Scores of new programmers have entered the market and are redefining
programming to accommodate different viewing patterns associated with
the Internet
In the distribution lawyer, new CDNs are being constructed with
substantial resources. Others regularly join the community at one or more
of the three tiers of Internet connectivity. The most dramatic change in
the structure is at the edge, where ATSC 3.0 and the buildout of microand pico-cells is occurring to improve mobile video capacity.
Advertisers are flocking to targeted advertising and relaxing the old
bonds that glued them to traditional programmers for spot advertising.
The structure in these markets will continue to concentrate and fragment
as incumbents buy up new entrants that show the most promise of
success, and other new entrants fill in behind them, using new
configurations of technology.
So where is government intervention needed to keep the Internet
invisible? As a theoretical matter, it is needed where those with market
power or those acting in concert increase entry barriers and where were
switching costs for purchasers are particularly high or artificially
established.
260. Id. at 333 (Pai, dissenting).
261. Id. at 324 (Pai, dissenting).
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In the producer to programmer market, new entry collides with new
methods and temptations to restrict it. But in this market, variations in
behavior are strongly driven by differences in artistic and marketing
judgments and by the huge number of permutations for business
arrangements. The large numbers of content producers and the growing
number of programmers with different ideas about what programming
means for Internet TV means that the FCC cannot regulate this market
effectively without completely stifling creativity and innovation. Net
neutrality should not be extended to deals between producers and
programmers.
In the market where programmers and distributors strike deals with
each other, the arguments in favor of regulation are somewhat stronger.
While the number of distributors and the way they connect with each
other is highly malleable, the bandwidth demands of video mean that only
a few of them are equipped to handle it well. While there are many
programmers, and their number and technological diversity is growing,
enormous disparity in size increases the potential for programmers to
seek deals with distributors the lock out the new entrants.
The best way to pursue net neutrality goals here is for the FCC to
articulate a simple concept: that vertical exclusive deals must have an
articulable business justification. Suspect arrangements can be
scrutinized by complaint proceedings rather than by commission
enforcement initiatives.
It is in the distributor-to-consumer market and the distributor-todistributor markets where the argument in favor of regulation is most
persuasive. Here the Internet is most likely to lose its invisibility. If Time
Warner says to its cable subscribers, “you can only move Time Warner
programming through your set top boxes,” or Comcast says, “[Y]ou
cannot watch Netflix movies without paying an extra premium,” no one
would find a cable, DSL, or broadband wireless subscription acceptable
if it said you can shop nowhere but Amazon.
But even in this market, application of net neutrality principles is
fraught with difficulty. As ABC deploys ATSC 3.0 must its boomers
carry NBC programming as well as ABC’s? Must Fox’s apps offer access
to CBS programming as well as to Fox’s? Surely not; the inherent nature
of apps is to focus on, and be designed around, a particular kind of content
from a particular source. On the other hand, if a distributor prohibits the
use of certain apps in its subscription agreements or programs its set top
boxes to allow the HBO Now app but to exclude the Netflix app, that
does call for regulatory intervention.
More egregious instances of anti-competitive behavior not justified by
legitimate business considerations violate the antitrust laws. The best
regulatory approach for the markets where the need for FCC regulation
is most questionable is to provide greater opportunity for antitrust
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litigation. Presently, private antitrust actions are likely to be dismissed on
the grounds of the FCC has primary jurisdiction. The FCC could forbear
to exercise its primary jurisdiction in certain areas and explicitly say that
it intends to leave them open to antitrust scrutiny in the regular courts.
Such an approach contravenes the conventional wisdom that that
administrative agency regulation is preferable to Article III court
litigation in specialized areas of economic activity, but the opposite may
be true. The high transaction cost of antitrust litigation with its
unpredictable results would impose a substantial additional cost on
anticompetitive behavior. The existence of that possibility might be just
enough shadow of law to channel entrepreneurial energies into
productive deals that embrace the fruits of innovation rather than
blocking new sources of competition.

